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Contracting Correctness: A Rubric for
Analyzing Morality Clauses
Patricia Sánchez Abril ∗
Nicholas Greene ∗∗
Abstract
Morality clauses give a contracting party the right to
terminate if the other party behaves badly or embarrassingly. A
curious product of twentieth-century Hollywood, these contract
clauses have traditionally been used to control the antics of
entertainers and athletes. The current politically-sensitive
historical moment, combined with the internet’s ability to
broadcast widely and permanently, has put everyone’s off-duty
speech, conduct, and reputation under the microscope. Media
reports detailing people’s digital falls from grace abound. For fear
of negative association, businesses are more attuned than ever to
the extracurricular acts of their agents and associates—and are
increasingly binding them to morality clauses that allow for
abrupt separations.
However, morality clauses have largely escaped judicial and
academic scrutiny. Perhaps due to the hefty bargaining power of
their traditionally famous parties, most courts have generally
found these clauses enforceable with fleeting analysis. Outside of
the sports and entertainment industries, academic literature on
the morality clause is scant.
We ignore morality clauses at our peril. Like non-compete
clauses, which suffer from well-documented overuse and
overbreadth, morality clauses can be socially harmful. Their
unrestricted use allows and invites unpredictability, bad faith,
and broad limitations on expression, privacy, and other liberties.
∗ Associate Professor of Business Law, University of Miami School of
Business Administration.
∗∗ Lecturer of Business Law, University of Miami School of Business
Administration.
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This is especially true when imposed on low-profile agents with
little bargaining power.
Unlike the well-trodden area of non-competes, there is no
uniform rubric for assessing whether and to what extent morality
clauses are enforceable, fairly imposed, and lawfully interpreted.
This Article addresses this gap, offering to courts and jurists alike
a five-factor test by which to determine the validity of morality
clauses in a world where reputation pervades and the line between
home and office is blurred.
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I. Introduction
Since the beginning of time, people have sought to get out of
deals because they no longer wanted to be associated with the
other party in the public’s view. Maybe the offending party broke
the law, embarrassed himself, or stated an unpopular political
opinion. Or perhaps the desired rupture had more to do with a
soured relationship, bad faith, or even discrimination.
Morality clauses 1 generally grant a contracting party the
right to terminate if the other party behaves in an objectionable
manner or attracts disrepute. 2 These unilateral contract
provisions are usually broadly drafted, allowing for expansive
and often highly-subjective interpretations. 3 A product of the
twentieth century, morality clauses found their genesis with
1. Morality clauses are sometimes referred to as morals, moral turpitude,
public image, role model, personal conduct, behavioral or good conduct clauses.
For consistency, we refer to them as morality clauses throughout.
2. See Seth William Stern, The IRS’ Double-Bogey: Goosen v.
Commissioner Remains a Fairway to Characterize Endorsement Income for
Nonresident Alien Athletes in Garcia v. Commissioner, 20 JEFFREY S. MOORAD
SPORTS L.J. 605, 622 (2013) [hereinafter Stern, The IRS’ Double-Bogey]
(explaining how morality clauses protect endorsed parties in endorsement
contracts from damage to their reputation caused by the endorsee’s disreputable
behavior as well as from subsequent devaluation of the endorsement caused by
the endorsee’s damaged image).
3. See Fernando M. Pinguelo & Timothy D. Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares
About Morals? An Examination of Morals Clauses in Talent Contracts and What
Talent Needs to Know, 19 SETON HALL J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 347, 370 (2009)
[hereinafter Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?] (describing
the broad provisions preferred by employers such as companies and major
sports leagues).
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libertine actors in the Roaring Twenties 4 and have grown to nearuniversality in the sports and entertainment industries today. 5
To date, almost all of the legal scholarship on morality
clauses
focuses
on
high-profile
personalities
in
endorsement-related agreements. 6 However, these contract
4. See id. at 354 (explaining how declining film attendance rates,
attributed to actors’ off-screen misbehavior, led to early examples of morality
clauses in talent contracts).
5. See id. at 363–64 (describing the prevalence of morality clauses in the
contracts of professional athletes, entertainers, and corporate executives).
6. See generally id. (discussing morality clauses in talent agreements);
Daniel Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete
Endorsement Contracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1 (2005)
[hereinafter Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection] (discussing
morality clauses in athlete endorsement agreements); Porcher L. Taylor, III. et
al., The Reverse-Morals Clause: The Unique Way to Save Talent’s Reputation
and Money in a New Era of Corporate Crimes and Scandals, 28 CARDOZO ARTS &
ENT. L.J. 65 (2010) [hereinafter Taylor, III. et al., The Reverse-Morals Clause]
(discussing reverse-morals clauses in talent agreements); Adam Epstein, An
Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, 21 J. LEGAL ASPECTS SPORT 5 (2011)
[hereinafter Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports]
(discussing morality clauses in professional sports); Paul A. Czarnota, Athlete
Privacy Rights and Endorsement Contracts: An Analysis of U.S., U.K., and
Australian Law, 11 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 460 (2012) (same); Joshua S.E. Lee &
Jaimie K. McFarlin, Sports Scandals from the Top-Down: Comparative Analysis
of Management, Owner, and Athletic Discipline in the NFL & NBA, 23 JEFFREY
S. MOORAD SPORTS L.J. 69 (2016) (same). Morality clauses have been a popular
topic for student notes and practitioner literature. See generally Stern, supra
note 2 (discussing morality clauses in professional sports); Noah B. Kressler,
Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A Historical, Legal and Practical
Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235 (2005) [hereinafter Kressler, Using the Morals
Clause] (discussing morality clauses in talent agreements); Andrew Zarriello, A
Call to the Bullpen: Alternatives to the Morality Clause as Endorsement
Companies’ Main Protection Against Athletic Scandal, 56 B.C. L. REV. 389 (2015)
(discussing morality clauses in athletic endorsement agreements); Kira N.
Buono, Athletes Sacked by Moral Turpitude Clauses: Presumed Guilty Unless
Proven Innocent, 41 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 367 (2015)
[hereinafter Buono, Athletes Sacked by Moral Turpitude Clauses] (discussing
morality clauses in professional sports); Caroline Epstein, Morals Clauses: Past,
Present and Future, 5 N.Y.U. J. INTELL. PROP. & ENT. L. 72 (2015) [hereinafter
Epstein, Morals Clauses] (discussing morality clauses in entertainment
industries); Sarah D. Katz, Note, “Reputations . . . A Lifetime to Build, Seconds
to Destroy”: Maximizing the Mutually Protective Value of Morals Clauses in
Talent Agreements, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 185 (2011) [hereinafter Katz,
Note, Reputations] (discussing morality clauses in talent agreements); Lauren
Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less: A Look at Morals Clauses in Athlete
Endorsement Agreements, 11 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 129
(2015) [hereinafter Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less] (discussing morality
clauses in athletic endorsement agreements); Nathan Law, Manufacturing a
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clauses have slowly and quietly found their way into contracts
and enforceable employee handbooks at all levels. 7 As one author
put it, “any talented individual who is or may become associated
with a company or organization in the minds of the public is
likely to have a morals clause included in his or her contract.” 8
And given the ubiquity of social media and the ease and
permanence of digital information, virtually anyone can become
associated with a company or organization in the minds of the
public. Authors, teachers, executives, board members, donors,
franchisors, and even rank-and-file employees are often subject to
contractual restrictions on off-duty behavior and potential
ensuing embarrassment. 9
Morality clauses have generally been held to be valid and
enforceable as applied to high-profile figures. 10 One could rightly
argue that the precept of freedom of contract allows parties the
latitude to bargain and create the terms of their own agreements.
Moreover, few can dispute the laudable ends of curtailing
someone’s right to behave badly.
However, it does not follow that these curious contract
clauses should escape scrutiny. Any contract clause that broadly
and vaguely restricts civil liberties deserves close inquiry,
Run: How Major League Baseball Can Use the Morals Clause to Clean Up
Baseball, 48 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 539 (2015) (discussing morality clauses in
professional baseball); Sarah Osborn Hill, How to Protect Your Brand When
Your Spokesperson Is Behaving Badly: Morals Clauses in Spokesperson
Agreements, 57 FED. LAW. 14 (2010) (discussing morality clauses in endorsement
agreements).
7. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 365–66 (describing morality clauses for models, authors, multimedia
designers, and others).
8. Id. at 366.
9. Some professions charged with public trust and safety have morality
requirements made explicit by statute or governing rules. Lawyers are an
obvious example. Other examples include air transport pilots, who are required
by the Federal Aviation Regulations to maintain “good moral character.” 14
C.F.R. § 61.153(c). Police officers are another example, and are required by state
law to maintain good moral character generally. See, e.g., FL. STAT. § 943.13(7)
(2013). These examples are beyond the scope of this Article, as they are not
contractual in nature.
10. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380 (AM. LAW INST. 1958)
(discussing an agent’s duty not to bring disrepute upon the principal); Taylor,
III. et al., supra note 6, at 105 n.237 (describing the enforceability of morality
clauses against television actors, directors, and screenwriters).
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especially when imposed on parties with little bargaining power.
Non-compete clauses, which restrain trade in the name of a
principal’s business interest, suffer from similar overuse and
overbreadth. 11 Both clauses have gained popularity in the modern
business environment, as employers grasp for more control in a
globalized and interconnected world. 12 Unlike morality clauses,
however, the law of non-competes is well-trodden—their use is
strictly regulated by state legislatures and examined by courts
with well-established tests for their validity. 13 Recent reports of
their overuse have even elicited White House response. 14
Morality clauses, on the contrary, have been largely ignored.
There is much that current law leaves unanswered. Under what
circumstances should a court invalidate a morality clause? Are
the current rules—formulated throughout almost a century of
cases about famous people—applicable to a clerk, a product
manager, or a baggage handler? In the age of social media and
political correctness, how should courts measure the dauntingly
slippery concepts of “public disrepute” or “public scandal”? When
is enforcing a morality clause necessary for protecting a
legitimate business interest? When is it simply a pretext for bad
faith or discrimination?
A review of the extant case law and literature reveals an
obvious gap in this highly-subjective area of contract law—there
11. See Jonathan L. Israel, State Attorneys General on the Attack Against
Noncompete Overuse, NAT’L L. REV. (Aug. 15, 2016), http://www.nat
lawreview.com/article/state-attorneys-general-attack-against-noncompete-overuse
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (describing enforcement reactions against the overuse
of non-compete agreements) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
12. See Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, supra note
6, at 78 (explaining the enhanced demand for morality clauses in the modern era
of social media and reduced privacy).
13. See generally Michael J. Garrison & John T. Wendt, The Evolving Law
of Employee Noncompete Agreements: Recent Trends and an Alternative Policy
Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 107 (2008) (providing an overview of state and
federal systems of regulating non-compete agreements).
14. See generally Non-Compete Agreements: Analysis of the Usage, Potential
(May
2016),
Issues,
and
State
Responses,
THE WHITE HOUSE
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/non-competes_report_final2.pdf
(“These agreements currently impact nearly a fifth of U.S. workers, including a
large number of low-wage workers. This brief delineates issues regarding
misuse of non-compete agreements and describes a sampling of state laws and
legislation to address the potentially high costs of unnecessary non-competes to
workers and the economy.”).
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is no uniform rubric for assessing whether and to what extent
morality clauses are enforceable, fairly imposed, and lawfully
interpreted.
This Article proposes to address this gap, offering to courts
and jurists alike an organizational lens through which to analyze
morality clauses. Part II provides an overview of the history and
justifications of morality clauses. It also discusses the impact of
the democratization of information flow on the market for
morality clauses. The internet, and particularly social media, has
expanded the reach of the average person’s speech and behavior.
Any individual with company ties can ostensibly affect a
company’s reputation negatively, at least by association. A second
aggravating
factor
affecting
the
implementation
and
interpretation of modern morality clauses is the current
sensitivity in public discourse, commonly referred to as political
correctness. Part III of the Article discusses the legal and public
policy issues inherent in morality clauses, especially as applied to
non-public figures. In Part IV, we present a multi-factor test to
ascertain to what extent morality clauses are enforceable. Each
factor of the proposed analysis is buttressed by established legal
principles and social science. Looking at morality clauses through
the lens of this five-pronged analysis will allow for their more
efficient, balanced, and just use and enforcement as against a
variety of contracting parties.
II. Morality Clauses: Taxonomy and Evolution
A “morality clause” 15 is a contractual provision that gives one
contracting party (usually a company) the unilateral right to
terminate the agreement, or take punitive action against the
other party (usually an individual whose endorsement or image is
sought) in the event that such other party engages in
reprehensible behavior or conduct that may negatively impact his
or her public image and, by association, the public image of the
15. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 351 n.10 (“The term ‘morals clause’ . . . has several alternative
formulations. These analogous counterparts include . . . ‘morality clauses.’”
(quoting Daniel Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection in Athlete
Endorsement Contracts, 3 DEPAUL J. SPORTS L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 3 (2005))).
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contracting company. 16 Such clauses can prohibit a variety of
behaviors and consequences depending on the breadth of the
language used. 17
A. Taxonomy
For ease of reference, we will refer to two general types of
morality clauses: those prohibiting certain behavior outright
(“Bad Behavior clauses”) and those prohibiting the backlash or
reputational consequences of bad acts, sometimes measured by a
public outcry, scandal, or ridicule (“Reputational Impact
clauses”). 18 Although these terms are neither technical nor widely
used, they are helpful for our purposes in distinguishing the two
most common types of restrictions in morality clauses. 19 One
should also note that they are not mutually exclusive, as some
contracts may contain both prohibitions. 20
1. Bad Behavior Clauses
At their most narrow and defined, some morality clauses
contain outright prohibitions on certain unwanted behavior,
irrespective of the act’s impact or association. 21 For instance, a
narrowly drafted clause could cover behavior such as failing a
drug test, an arrest, or conviction of a crime. 22 Broader morality
16. Id. at 351.
17. See Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less, supra note 6, at 132
(explaining that morality clauses “cover illegal drug use, drug dependency,
criminal conduct, and public criticism injuring the athlete or endorser’s
reputation or the value of the endorser,” among a plethora of other behaviors).
18. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 224–26 (providing a
comprehensive classification of the various examples of morality clauses in
different industries).
19. See id. at 189 (discussing the “inefficacy of the two morals clause
models currently used in U.S. and international talent agreements: (1) the
‘morality’ trigger; and (2) the ‘disrepute’ trigger”).
20. See id. at 218 (describing that talent agreements that use morality and
disrepute triggers fail to “maximize the protective value of morals clauses”).
21. See id. at 202 (stating that “during the heyday of the Hollywood studio
system,” standard contracts encompassed basically everything pursuant to a
contract signee’s life).
22. See id. at 202–03 (discussing that a clause prohibiting interracial
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clauses may encompass any conduct that is outside of public
morals or decency or acceptable social norms. 23
One example is found in the 1918 case of Ackerman v.
Siegel 24—the earliest reported morality clause case. 25 In this case,
an employer included a provision in an employee’s written
contract that simply prohibited the employee’s “bad behavior or
fast living.” 26 When the employer discovered that the employee
secretly charged an extra fee to customers, the employer
terminated the contract. 27 The employee brought a claim for
unlawful discharge, and the New York Supreme Court found that
the employer rightfully terminated the agreement under the
morality clause. 28
2. Reputational Impact Clauses
Instead of forbidding certain definite acts or, much more
generally—indecency or bad behavior at large—some morality
clauses are even less self-defining. That is, the act triggering
termination is not measured by its own substance, but rather by
the effect that it produces in the community, or, more specifically,
on the other contracting party. 29 These clauses generally contain
language prohibiting acts that offend the community, or that
reflect unfavorably on either of the contracting parties 30 or bring
dating once existed).
23. See Stern, The IRS’ Double-Bogey, supra note 2, at 622 (discussing
clauses concerning athletes who compete in tournaments, such as clauses
reflecting that athlete’s image and mandatory attendance of particular
tournaments).
24. 170 N.Y.S. 522 (App. Term 1918).
25. See id. at 523 (“The conduct of the plaintiff in soliciting the alleged
commission was certainly behavior tending to imperil the morals and success of
defendant’s shop.”).
26. Id. at 522.
27. Id. at 522–23.
28. Id. at 523.
29. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 213 (discussing actor
Michael Nader’s suit against ABC when ABC terminated Nader’s contract
because of his arrest for selling cocaine to an undercover police officer that ABC
claimed tainted its programs (citing Nader v. ABC Television, Inc., 150 Fed.
App’x 54, 55 (2d Cir. 2005))).
30. See Rosenbaum, 140 Characters or Less, supra note 6, at 132 (“In
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the offending party “into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or
ridicule, or tend to shock, insult or offend the majority of the
consuming public or any protected class or group thereof.” 31 A
public outcry, scandal or adverse reaction is evidence that the act
has negatively affected the reputation of one or both parties. 32
Other contracts adopt a broader approach, requiring no
evidence of a scandal, only a unilateral assessment that
reputational harm has occurred. 33 The morals clause found in
NFL player contracts is an example: it allows a team to
unilaterally fire a player if he has engaged in conduct deemed to
adversely affect, or reflect on, the team. 34 Based on the language,
it is plausible to conclude that a team could terminate a player if
in its sole discretion it believes his behavior could adversely affect
or reflect on the team, regardless of actual damage.
B. The Logic and Evolution of Morality Clauses
However worded or classified, the logic behind morality
clauses is relatively straightforward and intuitive: organizations
want to be able to disassociate from reputational hazards for fear
of the negative spillover effect caused by an actor’s bad
general, a morals clause may include behavior that ‘(a) is not ‘with due regard’
to ‘social conventions and public morals and decency’; (b) ‘shocks, insults or
offends’ the community; or (c) ‘reflects unfavorably’ on the person, the financier,
the producer, the employer, or the distributor.” (quoting THOMAS D. SELZ,
MELVIN SIMENSKY & PATRICIA NASSIF ACTON, ENTERTAINMENT LAW 3D: LEGAL
CONCEPTS AND BUSINESS PRACTICES § 9:107 (2013))).
31. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (M.D.N.C.
2012).
32. See id. at 719–23 (discussing that due to Mendenhall’s tweets, he
received public scrutiny regarding the words that he was putting on the
internet).
33. See Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection, supra note 6, at
10 (“The parties should determine ahead of time whether a unilateral decision
on the part of the company is sufficient for termination.”).
34. See NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE & NAT’L FOOTBALL LEAGUE PLAYERS ASS’N,
COLLECTIVE BARGAINING AGREEMENT 260 (2011), https://nfllabor.files.
wordpress.com/2010/01/collective-bargaining-agreement-2011-2020.pdf (explaining
that under § 11 of the NFL Player Contract, a football club may terminate the
player contract “[i]f at any time, in the sole judgment of the Club . . . [the]
Player has engaged in personal conduct reasonably judged by the Club to
adversely affect or reflect on [the] Club . . . .”).
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behavior. 35 The underlying assumption, of course, is that an
individual with ties to the organization—whether an official
endorser or an employee wearing the company uniform—
represents the organization in the public’s eyes. 36 Thus, their acts
and reputation are attributable to the company and its
products. 37
The power of association is well documented in philosophy
and psychology. Consumer behavior research also supports the
notion. In the late 1980s, consumer studies professor, Grant
McCracken, articulated this phenomenon as “meaning
transfer.” 38 His theory suggests that an endorser’s cultural
meaning flows through consumer goods and ultimately transfers
to the consumer’s life. 39 That is, celebrity endorsers carry cultural
meanings (i.e., allusions to status, class, gender, lifestyle, and
values). 40 The advertising system enables a metaphoric
transference of these meanings to products. 41 Consumers then
“take possession of these meanings and put them to work in the
construction of their notions of self and the world.” 42 More recent
35. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 352 (describing that morality clauses “protect the contracting company
from the immoral behavior of the talent with whom it contracts” (citing Noah B.
Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent Agreements: A Historical, Legal and
Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235, 235 (2005))).
36. See id. at 349 (“[T]oday’s increasingly public society, where the
proliferation of tabloids, celebrity gossip blogs, and news magazines inundate
the public with information on talent’s personal lives . . . .”).
37. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 191 (“[T]he non-talent’s
industry determines the manner in which the talent’s image will be used to
generate beneficial value for non-talent . . . .”).
38. Grant McCracken, Culture and Consumption: A Theoretical Account of
the Structure and Movement of the Cultural Meaning of Consumer Goods, 13 J.
CONSUMER RES. 71, 74 (1986) [hereinafter McCracken, Culture and
Consumption].
39. See id. at 71 (“Cultural meaning flows continually between its several
locations in the social world, aided by the collective and individual efforts of
designers, producers, advertisers, and consumers.”).
40. See id. at 76 (“Motion picture and popular music stars, revered for their
status, their beauty, and sometimes their talent . . . . [I]nvent and deliver a
species of meaning that has been largely fashioned from the prevailing cultural
coordinates established by cultural categories and cultural principles.”).
41. See id. (“These opinion leaders are permeable to cultural innovations,
changes in style, value, and attitude, which they then pass along to the
subordinate parties who imitate them.”).
42. Grant McCracken, Who Is the Celebrity Endorser? Cultural
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elaborations on this theory suggest that negative associations are
more likely to transfer to a brand than positive ones. 43 It is
through these natural associations that consumers come to
approve or reject products as symbolic of their own lives. 44 It
stands to reason then, that a company representative who
behaves badly will engender negative associations in consumers’
minds, and these will likely be reflected onto the company’s
product.
It was exactly this fear of a negative association—and impact
on the bottom line—that became the first major catalyst for the
use of morality clauses in the early 1920s. 45 As the media
increasingly reported on the debaucherous behavior of Hollywood
stars, the American public began to condemn their allegedly wild
lifestyles. 46 As ticket sales decreased considerably, the movie
industry blamed the actors’ behavior and the subsequent media
reports for their downturn and, as a result, started including Bad
Behavior Clauses in movie contracts. 47
Foundations of the Endorsement Process, 16 J. CONSUMER RES. 310, 314 (1989).
43. See Margaret Campbell & Caleb Warren, A Risk of Meaning Transfer:
Are Negative Associations More Likely to Affect Transfer Than Positive
Associations?, 7 SOC. INFLUENCE & CONSUMER BEHAV. 172, 172 (2012) (“Three
studies show that brands are more likely to acquire the negative than the
positive personality traits associated with a celebrity endorser and that negative
associations transfer even under conditions that inhibit the transfer of positive
associations.”).
44. See id. (“[B]rands acquire associations through links with other cultural
entities, including . . . products . . . .”).
45. See Buono, Athletes Sacked by Moral Turpitude Clauses, supra note 6,
at 378 (“The moral turpitude clause originated during the Roaring ‘20s in
Hollywood, California.” (citing Mark Kesten, Reputation Insurance: Why
Negotiating for Moral Reciprocity Should Emerge as a Much Needed Source of
Protection for the Employee, CORNELL HR REV. (Nov. 23, 2012),
http://www.cornellhrreview.org/reputation-insurance-why-negotiating-for-moral-reci
procity-should-emerge-as-a-much-needed-source-of-protection-for-the-employee/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review))).
46. See id. at 378–79 (discussing that since there was an “increase in the
media’s interest in reporting” the illicit acts of movie stars, certain movie
studios “promulgated morals clauses” to “shield” themselves from imputed
negative reputation).
47. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 354 (“Much of the focus of the press was on the individual movie stars,
whose ‘garish and scandalous’ behavior was often blamed for declines in film
attendance.” (quoting Auerbach, Morals Clauses As Corporate Protection, supra
note 6, at 3)).
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In 1921, shortly after signing a three million dollar contract
with Paramount Pictures, comedian Roscoe “Fatty” Arbuckle was
accused of the rape and murder of a young female guest of one of
his parties. 48 The state brought charges after a witness told police
she had heard screaming coming from a room in which Arbuckle
had gone with the guest. 49 Although he was later acquitted of the
crimes, his public image was irreparably damaged. 50 As a result,
the benefit Paramount stood to gain from his lucrative contract
diminished greatly. 51 The case has since been said to have
inspired production companies to include morality clauses in
talent agreements. 52 In fact, later that same year, Universal
Studios began inserting the following clause into all of its actor
and director contracts:
The actor (actress) agrees to conduct himself (herself) with due
regard to public conventions and morals and agrees that he
(she) will not do or commit anything tending to degrade him
(her) in society or bring him (her) into public hatred, contempt,
scorn or ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the
community or outrage public morals or decency, or tending to
the prejudice of the Universal Film Manufacturing Company
or the motion picture industry. In the event that the actor
(actress) violates any term or provision of this paragraph, then
the Universal Film Manufacturing Company has the right to
cancel and annul this contract by giving five (5) days’ notice to
the actor (actress) of its intention to do so. 53
48. See Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, supra note
6, at 76 (discussing that Fatty hosted a party where a female guest was “found
severely injured in his hotel suite,” and that she later died).
49. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note Error! Bookmark not
defined., at 236 (citing Sam Stoloff, Fatty Arbuckle and the Black Sox: The
Paranoid Style of American Popular Culture, 1919–1922, in HEADLINE
HOLLYWOOD: A CENTURY OF FILM SCANDAL 56 (Adrienne L. McClean & David A.
Cook eds., 2001)).
50. See id. (“Public opinion quickly turned against the comedian as
newspapers nationwide gave the story front-page coverage.” (citing ROBERT H.
STANLEY, THE CELLULOID EMPIRE: A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN MOVIE INDUSTRY
180 (Hastings House Pub. 1978))).
51. Id.
52. See id. at 237 (discussing how studios started adding morality clauses
“to quickly disassociate from” scandalous behaviors deemed reprehensible by the
public and media).
53. Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 3,
at 355 n.30.
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The next major historical phase for morality clauses occurred
between the late 1940s and early 1960s. At this time, the United
States was in the midst of the McCarthy era—a period known for
its extreme fear and condemnation of Communism. 54 In 1947, as
part of the government’s phobia of the far left, the congressional
House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) held nine days
of hearings to investigate the alleged Communist infiltration of
Hollywood’s motion picture industry. 55 Throughout the hearings,
HUAC cited ten “unfriendly” witnesses for contempt of Congress
when they refused to answer questions relating to whether they
had ever associated with the Communist party. 56
No one wanted to be associated with an alleged Communist.
Studios fired the witnesses based on their alleged involvement in
Communist activities. 57 Subsequently, three of the witnesses
sued their respective employers, alleging that their terminations
were based on unjustly expansive readings of the morality
clauses in their contracts. 58 One was Lester Cole, who had been
employed as a screenwriter for Loew’s, Inc., doing business as
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer films (MGM). 59 Cole’s employment was
pursuant to a written agreement, which included the following
morality clause:
The employee agrees to conduct himself with due regard to
public conventions and morals, and agrees that he will not do
or commit any act or thing that will tend to degrade him in
society or bring him into public hatred, contempt, scorn or
ridicule, or that will tend to shock, insult or offend the
community or ridicule public morals or decency, or prejudice
54. See Robert M. Lichtman, McCarthyism and the Court: The Need for “an
Uncommon Portion of Fortitude in the Judges,” 39 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 107, 108
(2014) (“The Court’s McCarthy era, which (in this reading) spanned the October
1949 through 1961 Terms . . . .”).
55. Id. at 109.
56. See Loew’s, Inc. v. Cole, 185 F.2d 641, 645 (9th Cir. 1950) (“When Cole
was called to the stand he was asked ‘Are you now or have you ever been a
member of the Communist Party?’ The statement he then made was interpreted
by the committee as a refusal to answer . . . .”).
57. See id. (stating that after Cole was called as a witness he “was sent a
notice of suspension” that discussed his refusal “to answer certain questions put
to [him] by such committee”).
58. See id. at 641 (summarizing that plaintiff did not believe that his
testimony warranted a violation of the employment agreement).
59. Id. at 644–45.
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the producer or the motion picture, theatrical or radio industry
in general. 60

After Cole was cited for contempt of Congress, MGM
terminated his agreement. 61 In his breach of contract case, the
Ninth Circuit held that MGM properly terminated Cole under the
agreement for two reasons. First, the court concluded that Cole’s
misdemeanor conviction was within the scope of the morality
clause. 62 Second, the court reasoned that Cole’s refusal to answer
questions regarding his alleged association with Communists
could be—and was publicly—interpreted as affirming his belief in
Communism. 63 The Ninth Circuit concluded that because “a large
segment of the public did look upon Communism and
Communists as things of evil, . . . it cannot be said, as a matter of
law, that in acting as he did Cole did not breach [the]
agreement.” 64
The Ninth Circuit subsequently heard cases from two more of
the ten convicted witnesses who were employed and terminated
pursuant to very similar morality clauses. 65 In each case, the
court affirmed its reasoning in Cole and found that the alleged
Communists violated their employment contracts and were
rightfully terminated. 66
60. Id. at 645.
61. See id. (“Cole was . . . sent a notice of suspension reading as follows:
‘Dear Mr. Cole . . . you refused to answer certain questions put to you . . . . By
your failure to answer these questions . . . . [T]his is to notify you that we have
elected to suspend your employment . . . .’”).
62. Se id. at 648 (“We think it rather elementary that one who, for
whatever motive, chooses to conduct himself in such manner as to be guilty of a
misdemeanor as serious as this one can hardly be said to be doing so ‘with due
regard to public conventions.’”).
63. See id. at 649 (“We think that a jury might well find as a fact that the
natural result of Cole’s refusal to say whether he was . . . a member of the
Communist party . . . was for the purpose of concealing his actual membership
in the party.”).
64. Id.
65. See Scott v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 240 F.2d 87, 91 (9th Cir. 1957)
(“We are confident that the morals clause in Scott’s contract was no weaker from
management’s position than Lardner’s. If there be shades of the two, Scott’s
clause was the stronger or stricter.”); Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp. v.
Lardner, 216 F.2d 844, 848 (9th Cir. 1954) (“One may observe that Lardner’s
contract said everything that Cole’s said and a little more.”).
66. See Scott, 240 F.2d at 91 (citing both Cole’s and Lardner’s contracts, the
court went on to say that an “opposite result in two companion cases so nearly
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In more recent years, morality clauses have become de rigeur
in endorsement agreements involving advertisers, television
personalities, movie stars, models, authors, and athletes. 67 While
a 1997 survey found that less than half of all endorsement
contracts included morals clauses, in 2003 that number had risen
to at least 75%. 68 The National Football League, National
Basketball Association, National Hockey League, and Major
League Baseball now all have standard player agreements that
include morality clauses. 69
The increasing popularity of morality clauses has spread
beyond the realm of the sports and entertainment industries and
into the corporate world. 70 Today, high-level corporate officers
have also become frequent subjects of media spotlight. 71 One
recent study found that of 375 CEO employment contracts, 271
included such clauses. 72 Further, moral turpitude has become one
of the most commonly listed reasons for a company terminating a
CEO. 73
alike would discredit the law”); Lardner, 216 F.2d at 850 (“The law of this circuit
having been established by Cole’s case . . . it is appropriate that the implication
of the same condition be made here.”).
67. See Auerbach, Morals Clauses as Corporate Protection, supra note 6, at
3 (“As important as the selection and negotiation process is for companies, they
can never be entirely certain that an endorser’s image is bulletproof. To hedge
against much of this risk, corporate employers are more often insisting on
stricter contractual protections, primarily through the inclusion of so-called
‘morals clauses.’”).
68. Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 3,
at 356.
69. Id. at 356–57.
70. See id. at 364 (“Morals clauses are also commonly employed in
agreements between corporations and their most talented executives, such as
‘C-level’ executives.”).
71. See Patricia Sanchez Abril & Ann M. Olazabal, The Celebrity CEO:
Corporate Disclosure at the Intersection of Privacy and Securities Law, 46 HOUS.
L. REV. 1545, 1551 (2010) (“We posit that it is the confluence of three historical
trends that has thrust CEOs onto center stage: higher levels of investment by
average folk, dramatically increased availability of detailed personal
information, and the reemergence of controversial business issues in popular
debate.”).
72. Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note 3,
at 364 (citing Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis
of CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 231, 248 (2006)).
73. See Stewart J. Schwab & Randall S. Thomas, An Empirical Analysis of
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The increasing incidence of morality clauses is no accident.
Several external factors, which we discuss in turn below, have led
to the rise of such clauses, as well as their use to terminate
agreements: (1) the rebirth of political correctness, 74 (2) the
ubiquity of social media and a reputation-centric economy, 75 and
(3) the increasing political and values-based engagement of
businesses. 76
1. Political Correctness and Sensitivity
In early 2016, professional boxer Manny Pacquiao ran for a
senate seat in his native Philippines. 77 During his campaign, he
publicly described homosexuals as “worse than animals.” 78
Subsequently, the sports apparel brand, Nike, terminated a
nearly eight-year endorsement agreement with Pacquiao—
presumably pursuant to a morality clause. 79 Today, offensive,
insensitive, and otherwise unpopular statements seem to land
celebrities and everyday people in hot water on a regular basis,
bringing about a long and widespread debate on tolerance, free
speech, and the merits of political correctness. 80
CEO Employment Contracts: What Do Top Executives Bargain For?, 63 WASH. &
LEE L. REV. 231, 248 (2006) (noting that 271 out of 375 terminations of
employment contracts were for moral turpitude, showing that it was part of the
“most common contractual bases” for terminating a CEO).
74. See infra Part II.B.1 (arguing that the rise in political correctness has
led to the promulgation of certain morality clauses that allow companies to
avoid guilt by association when such scrutiny arises).
75. See infra Part II.B.2 (discussing that due to the ability to reach a mass
audience much easier today via the internet and social media, which can have
severe dire consequences for both an employer and the employee).
76. See infra Part II.B.3 (stating that since businesses may also get
involved in political speech, and express values of their own, morality clauses
have been made to allow such business to terminate and separate from views or
speech that is antithetical to their stance on certain issues).
77. Darren Rovell, Nike Cuts Ties with Manny Pacquiao After Derogatory
Comments, ESPN (Feb. 18, 2016), http://espn.go.com/boxing/story/_/id/14793389/
nike-ends-endorsement-contract-manny-pacquiao (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
[hereinafter Rovell, Nike Cuts Ties with Manny Pacquiao] (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. “Political Correctness” has been defined in multiple ways. See
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Political correctness has gained new momentum in the past
few years, as the American public has become increasingly
socially liberal. While a 1996 Gallup Poll found that just 27% of
Americans felt that the government should recognize same-sex
marriages, a 2016 poll found that number had risen to 61%. 81
But a rise in tolerance has also ushered a rise in sensitivity. 82
Society has become increasingly sensitive, with many now going
so far as to recognize “microaggressions” as a new form of
intolerance. 83 One article noted that racial discrimination now
often surfaces as microaggressions or “brief, every day, often
unconsciously delivered exchanges that send denigrating
messages to people of color because they belong to a racial
minority group.” 84 For example, a teacher telling a student of
Politically Correct, MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2015)
(agreeing with the idea that people should be careful to not use language or
behave in a way that could offend a particular group of people); see also Michael
Kilian, Warning on Political Correctness: Endowment Head Sees Liberal
TRIB.
(July
31,
1991),
McCarthyism
on
Campuses,
CHICAGO
http://articles.chicagotribune.com/1991-07-31/news/9103240473_1_humanitiesendowment-chairman-lynne-cheney-liberal (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“The
term ‘political correctness’ is used—especially by conservatives—to refer to a
liberal orthodoxy that includes support for affirmative action programs,
outlawing hate speech and downplaying European and male influence on
Western civilization.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review);
James B. Clark, III, Political Correctness and the First Amendment: An
Untenable Conflict, 8 NAT’L B. ASS’N MAG. 12, 12 (1994)
Though difficult to define precisely, “political correctness” might
accurately be described as a movement guided, indeed energized, by
the tenet that the traditional Western/European culture and values
are inherently oppressive and must be challenged at every
opportunity in an effort to lift all of its victims from their traditionally
oppressed state.
81. Marriage, GALLUP, INC., http://www.gallup.com/poll/117328/marriage.
aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
82. See Judith Shulevitz, In College and Hiding from Scary Ideas, N.Y.
TIMES (Mar. 21, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/22/opinion/sunday/
judith-shulevitz-hiding-from-scary-ideas.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
(“[K]eeping college-level discussions ‘safe’ may feel good to the hypersensitive,
[but] it’s bad for them and for everyone else.”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
83. See Daniel Solórzano et al., Keeping Race in Place: Racial
Microaggressions and Campus Racial Climate at the University of California,
Berkeley, 23 CHICANO-LATINO L. REV. 15, 16 (2002) (explaining that “racial
microaggressions” are a “subtle form of racism” that “causes stress”).
84. Adina B. Appelbaum, Challenging Crimmigration: Applying Padilla
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foreign descent that she speaks English well could potentially
make that student feel excluded, as the teacher’s underlying
assumption is that English was not her first language. 85
On one hand, political correctness promotes empathy and
equality for traditionally disenfranchised groups. 86 In the words
of one academic, “[w]e embrace the commitment to equity that
underlies political correctness, and we applaud the shifts in
norms wrought by that commitment.” 87 Indeed, the vast majority
of Americans would now likely agree that overt racism and
sexism are unacceptable, and it is common to object to violators of
these societal norms. 88 This public shaming of discrimination and
insensitivity has done a great deal for tolerance—or at least the
appearance thereof—in the workplace, politics, and the
entertainment industry, among other places. 89 While many
argue, likely correctly, that prejudice is still very much alive in
American culture, 90 something can be said for an era in which
Negotiation Strategies Outside the Criminal Courtroom, 6 GEO. J.L. & MOD.
CRITICAL RACE PERSP. 217, 241 (2014).
85. See Kathy Wyer, UCLA Ed Professors Carola Suárez-Orozco and
Daniel Solorzano Share Insights on Subtle, Often Unintentional Slights on Race,
Gender,
Status,
UCLA
ED.
&
IS,
(June
2,
2015),
https://ampersand.gseis.ucla.edu/micro
aggressions-what-you-need-to-know/
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Oftentimes unconscious and automatic,
microaggressions (MAs) are brief, subtle verbal or non-verbal exchanges that
send denigrating messages to the recipient because of his or her group
membership (such as race, gender, age or socio-economic status.”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
86. See Paul Richard Kuehn, Is Political Correctness Good for Everyone?,
http://hubpages.com/politics/Does-Being-Politically-Correct-MakeHUBPAGES,
Everyone-a-Winner (last updated Aug. 18, 2016) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
(detailing how, over the years, political correctness has manifested into “new
politically correct words” that are used “in referring to ethnic groups, races, jobs,
and people with disabilities”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
87. Robin J. Ely et al., Rethinking Political Correctness, 84 HARV. BUS. REV.
79, 80 (2006).
88. See Mike LaBossiere, Ad Baculum, Racism & Sexism, TALKING
PHILOSOPHY:
THE
PHILOSOPHERS’
MAG.
BLOG
(May
9,
2014),
http://blog.talkingphilosophy.com/?p=7932 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“[O]vert
racism and sexism are regarded as unacceptable and those who make racist or
sexist claims sometimes find themselves the object of public disapproval.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
89. See id. (“In some cases, making such claims can cost a person his job.”).
90. See Clark, supra note 80, at 13 (stating that the political correctness
movement embraces “simple-minded solutions to deep-rooted historical
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people are encouraged to be tolerant of others—at least at the
surface level.
Still, the political correctness movement has more than its
share of critics. 91 The term political correctness itself is often said
with a negative connotation, and it is frequently thought to refer
to language that is not just tolerant but excessively inoffensive. 92
Critics of political correctness argue that simply using different
words in everyday discourse does not solve the deep-rooted
problems of marginalized groups. 93 Additionally, these skeptics
claim, perhaps accurately, that by publicly demonizing the
politically incorrect, proponents of the movement leave little room
for dissent. 94 The political correctness movement has also been
chastised as conflicting with the spirit of the First Amendment—
that optimal solutions are the result of free public debate and the
uninhibited exchange of ideas. 95

problems”); Alicia Luke, Employment Discrimination Litigation: Social Science
Evidence and a Solution for the Problem of Presumptions, 29 TEMP. J. SCI. TECH.
& ENVTL. L. 75, 94 (2010) (“While it appears that discrimination is still alive and
well, it often manifests in a more nuanced kind of discrimination than that
which occurred during the Civil Rights Era.” (citing Reid v. Lockheed Martin
Aeronautics Co., 205 F.R.D. 655, 660 (N.D. Ga. 2001))).
91. See David Limbaugh, Political Correctness Doesn’t Only Threaten
Speech, PEOPLE’S PUNDIT DAILY: INDEP. DATA JOURNALISM (Sept. 20, 2016),
https://www.peoplespunditdaily.com/opinion/2016/09/20/political-correctnessdoesnt-threaten-speech-2/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (explaining that political
correctness not only adversely affects free speech, but race relations on college
campuses and the messages that it sends) (on file with the Washington and Lee
Law Review).
92. See Jonathan Chait, Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say, N.Y. MAG.: DAILY
INTELLIGENCER/NAT’L INT. (Jan. 27, 2015, 8:00 AM), http://nymag.com/daily
/intelligencer/2015/01/not-a-very-pc-thing-to-say.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
[hereinafter Chait, Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say] (discussing that individuals
such as Bill Maher, Ayaan Hirsi Ali, and Condoleeza Rice were the subject of
protests on college campuses based on their recently voiced opinions) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
93. See Clark, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing that some of the
problems faced by marginalized groups are “poverty, lack of education and
societal ignorance”).
94. Id. at 12.
95. See id. (saying that political correctness is a new “insidious” challenge
to the First Amendment’s principles because “it has allied itself” with the First
Amendment’s traditional friends: “the poor, the downtrodden and the
different”).
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Regardless of one’s personal philosophy on political
sensitivity and correctness, it is inarguable that the movement is
supported by a large and vocal portion of the American public and
that refusal to conform can lead to serious economic
consequences. 96 Consider once-beloved A-list actor turned
infamous anti-Semite Mel Gibson. 97 In 2006, Gibson was arrested
by a Los Angeles Sherriff’s Department Officer for driving under
the influence of alcohol. 98 During his arrest, a drunken,
belligerent Gibson demanded to know whether the officer was
Jewish and alleged that “the Jews are responsible for all the wars
in the world.” 99 That police report was made public, and Gibson
has since landed very few movie roles and has struggled to escape
the stigma related to those comments. 100 Or recall former Los
Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling, who was nationally
scorned after a recording was made public in which he
complained to his girlfriend that she spent too much time
associating with black people. 101 Sterling’s statements
96. See Conor Friedersdorf, Stripping a Professor of Tenure Over a Blog
Post, THE ATLANTIC (Feb. 9, 2015), https://www.theatlantic.com/education/
archive/2015/02/stripping-a-professor-of-tenure-over-a-blog-post/385280/ (last
updated Feb. 10, 2015) (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (discussing a Marquette
professor that had his tenure terminated when he wrote a blog post pursuant to
a discussion between a student and another professor regarding gay marriage)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
97. See Allison Hope Weiner, Mel Gibson Apologizes for Tirade After Arrest,
N.Y. TIMES (Jul. 30, 2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/07/30/us/30gibson.html
(last updated Aug. 3, 2006) (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (discussing Mel Gibson’s
anti-Semitic remarks) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
98. Id.
99. Id.
100. See Ethan Sacks, Mel Gibson’s Career Never Recovered, 10 Years After
Anti-Semitic Rant, DAILY NEWS: ENT. (July 26, 2016, 6:00 AM),
http://www.nydailynews.com/entertainment/gossip/mel-gibson-career-recoveredanti-semitic-rant-article-1.2725688 (last visited Mar. 2, 2017) (“Thursday marks
a decade since Gibson’s drunken rant . . . and his career still hasn’t recovered.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
101. See Ben Golliver, NBA Investigating Clippers Owner Donald Sterling
for Alleged Racist Comments, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Apr. 26, 2014),
http://www.si.com/nba/point-forward/2014/04/26/donald-sterling-nba-investigationracist-comments-clippers (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) [hereinafter Golliver, NBA
Investigating Clippers] (noting that Donald Sterling stated to V. Stiviano that
he did not want her to bring black people to the basketball games, including
former basketball player Earvin “Magic” Johnson) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
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immediately became the center of attention for American news
outlets, after which the National Basketball Association banned
him for life. 102
In a society in which insensitivity and intolerance are the
subjects of widespread public shaming, the individual perpetrator
is not the only party affected. 103 Associates of the politically
incorrect often receive immense pressure to denounce the
questionable behavior, or risk being perceived as condoning it. 104
To avoid such guilt by association, companies are quick to
distance themselves from employees or corporate partners that
become the center of such scrutiny. 105 For example, in 2013,
celebrity chef Paula Deen lost a book deal as well as a contract
with the Food Network after admitting in a deposition that she
had used racist language and had tolerated racial jokes in the
past. 106

102. Dan Hirschhorn, NBA Bans Donald Sterling ‘For Life’ After Racist
Rant, TIME (Apr. 29, 2014), http://time.com/81170/donald-sterling-los-angelesclippers-nba-adam-silver/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
103. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 352 (“The underlying purpose of a morals clause . . . is to protect the
contracting company from the immoral behavior of the talent with whom it
contracts.” (citing Noah B. Kressler, Using the Morals Clause in Talent
Agreements: A Historical, Legal and Practical Guide, 29 COLUM. J.L. & ARTS 235,
235 (2005))).
104. See Ten Athletes Who Lost Their Endorsements, FOX SPORTS (Feb. 19,
2016, 2:07 AM), http://www.foxsportsasia.com/news/ten-athletes-lost-endorse
ments/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (discussing Michael Phelps’s lost
endorsements when a video emerged on the internet of him smoking marijuana)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
105. See John Santucci, The Companies that Have Dumped Donald Trump,
ABC NEWS (July 4, 2015, 3:00 PM), http://abcnews.go.com/Politics/companiesdumped-donald-trump/story?id=32162703 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (providing
that that companies such as Univision, NBC Universal, Macy’s, and others
separated ties with Trump when he made comments about Mexico during the
announcement of his running for President) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
106. Katie Rogers, Paula Deen Faces Backlash Over ‘I Love Lucy’ Posting,
N.Y. TIMES (July 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/07/09/nytnow/pauladeen-faces-backlash-over-i-love-lucy-posting.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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2. The Role of the Internet and Social Media
In addition to the public’s increased scrutiny of controversial
statements, through the rise of social media, such statements
now reach larger audiences than ever, and they are doing so
much faster. 107 This is true not only for celebrities but for the
general public as well. 108 In the third quarter of 2016, Facebook
alone had over 1.79 billion active users worldwide, continuing a
decade-long upward trend. 109 Although online connections often
“reflect pre-existing offline connections, social media also brings
together strangers with similar hobbies, interests, and political
views.” 110
Consequently, individuals’ comments, photos, videos, and
other actions on social media can often reach broad, unintended
audiences. 111 Information on Facebook, for instance, is public by
default unless the user manually increases his or her security
settings. 112 Thus, a common person’s well-timed Facebook or
Twitter comment can be seen by millions of people around the
world. 113 In fact, the Facebook post that received the most
107. See Doug Cross, 5 Ways Twitter Changed How We Communicate, CNN
(Mar. 21, 2011, 11:41 AM), http://www.cnn.com/2011/TECH/social.media/03/21/
twitter.birthday.communication/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (discussing how
Twitter removed the celebrity filter and made the flow of information faster,
among other things) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
108. See id. (claiming that if it was not for Twitter, little known bloggers,
journalists, and podcasters would not have as big an audience).
109. Number of Monthly Active Facebook Users Worldwide as of 3rd Quarter
2016 (in Millions), STATISTA, http://www.statista.com/statistics/264810/numberof-monthly-active-facebook-users-worldwide/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
110. Mary-Rose Papandrea, Social Media, Public School Teachers, and the
First Amendment, 90 N.C. L. REV. 1597, 1607 (2012).
111. Id. at 1607 (citing Lance Ulanoff, Your Digital Debris Is Haunting You,
PC MAG. (June 9, 2011), http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2386635,00.asp
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
112. Id. at 1608–09 (citing Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy:
A Timeline, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.
eff.org/deeplinks/2010/04/facebook-timeline (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review)).
113. See Kurt Opsahl, Facebook’s Eroding Privacy Policy: A Timeline,
ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Apr. 28, 2010), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/
2010/04/facebook-timeline (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (arguing that Facebook’s
growth came from communicating with a group of your choice to “where much of
your information is public” and that there is always going to be a certain
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interaction in 2015 was not that of any celebrity at all, but a
photo of a child holding a sign reading: “Can I get 1 million likes?
I BEAT CANCER.” 114 The photo received over 10 million likes, as
well as thousands of shares and comments. 115
While there is no shortage of positive, heartfelt energy on
social media, more negative or risqué activity often receives a
great deal of attention as well—causing trouble for employees of
all levels. For example, a part-time stadium guard for the
Philadelphia Eagles dispatched the following tweet after the
team let safety Brian Dawkins sign with the Denver Broncos in
2009: “Dan is [expletive] devastated about Dawkins signing with
Denver . . . . Dam Eagles R Retarded!!” 116 He was terminated
nearly immediately after his employer was informed of the
offensive and politically incorrect comment. 117 This employee is
just one of many disciplined for posting what their employers
considered inappropriate content on social media. 118 Some
businesses have even gone so far as to conduct social media
background checks through third-party companies, which scour
the internet for, among other things, “online evidence of racist
remarks.” 119 Before the advent of social media, such activities
would likely have remained among friends and family and would

amount of information that is public) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
114. Tessa Berenson, These Are the Top Facebook Posts of 2015, TIME (Dec.
31, 2015), http://time.com/4164895/top-facebook-posts-2015/ (last visited Mar. 4,
2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
115. Id.
116. Facebook Post Gets Worker Fired, ESPN (Mar. 9, 2009),
http://espn.go.com/nfl/news/story?id=3965039 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
117. See id. (noting that the employee was fired merely days after his
comment).
118. See Papandrea, supra note 110, at 1604 (explaining that teachers in
public schools can face severe punishments if they use social media in a way
that is “otherwise inappropriate or unprofessional”).
119. Jennifer Preston, Social Media History Becomes a New Job Hurdle,
N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/21/technology/
social-media-history-becomes-a-new-job-hurdle.html?_r=0 (last updated July 25,
2011) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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have never have come to the attention of employers, much less
the general public. 120
Social media can be particularly risky for users because
through features such as “liking,” “sharing,” and “retweeting,”
one can be connected to statements he or she did not even
make. 121 For instance, in April 2016, former MLB All-Star pitcher
and ESPN baseball analyst, Curt Schilling, was terminated by
ESPN—likely pursuant to a morality clause—after he shared an
arguably transphobic photo on Facebook. 122 Schilling later
defended his comments by arguing that he did not post the photo
himself but merely shared it. 123 Nonetheless, the ability to be so
clearly tied to the speech or actions of another person forces social
media users to be thoughtful and defensive in all of their online
activity.
The permanence of the internet further increases the
potential for negative attention. 124 While in-person comments
120. See Mike Simpson, Social Networking Nightmares: Cyberspeak No Evil,
NAT’L EDUC. ASS’N, http://www.nea.org/home/38324.htm (last visited Mar. 4,
2017) (“Thanks to Facebook . . . what used to be private is now very public.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
121. See James Parsons, What Exactly Does Liking a Tweet Do on Twitter?,
FOLLOWS.COM (Jan. 23, 2016), http://follows.com/blog/2016/01/tweet-likes-twitter
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (stating that liking tweets can be a bookmarking tool,
used for expressing appreciation, showing acknowledgement, and even mean
automatic support) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
122. See Richard Sanomir, Curt Schilling, ESPN Analyst, Is Fired Over
TIMES
(Apr.
20,
2016),
Offensive
Social
Media
Post,
N.Y.
http://www.nytimes.com/2016/04/21/sports/baseball/curt-schilling-is-fired-byespn.html?_r=1 (last updated Apr. 20, 2016) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
[hereinafter Sanomir, Curt Schilling] (“Schilling . . . was dismissed after sharing
a Facebook post . . . that appeared to respond to the North Carolina law that
bars transgender people from using bathrooms . . . .”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
123. See Andrew Joseph, Curt Schilling Defends His Anti-Transgender
Facebook Post: ‘I Didn’t Post That Ugly Looking Picture’, USA TODAY SPORTS
(Apr. 19, 2016), http://ftw.usatoday.com/2016/04/curt-schilling-anti-transgenderface book-post-denies-defends-post-espn-mlb (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
(“Schilling may not have been the original poster of the meme—he technically
shared it. But he still posted and endorsed the message it promoted.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
124. See Linda Criddle, What Teens Should Know About Online Reputations,
WEBROOT, https://www.webroot.com/us/en/home/resources/tips/managing-youronline-reputation/reputation-what-teens-should-know-about-online-reputations
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Each drop of information is collected into personal
virtual buckets. The information rarely disappears; instead, it accumulates,
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may be forgotten or explained away, Tweets can be analyzed
word-for-word and clearly displayed for the public long after they
are written, and often with little context. 125 Online activity can be
saved by others even if the original commenter later deletes a
post. 126 This concrete evidence of one’s actions adds yet another
layer of concern.
It is worth noting that in addition to social media, other
technological advances have made the public’s actions subject to
higher scrutiny than ever before. 127 For one, the ubiquity of
smartphones equips nearly everyone with a camera as well as a
high-quality recording device. 128 This caused the fall from grace
of former Los Angeles Clippers owner Donald Sterling, discussed
above, whose ex-girlfriend secretly recorded his racist comments
on her cellphone. 129 Moreover, the low prices of cameras in
general have ensured that a high percentage of our seemingly
private actions are memorialized. 130 This was a hard lesson for
former NFL running back Ray Rice, who was caught hitting his
slowly building a comprehensive picture of your identities and lives.”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
125. See id. (“Shedding an earlier image to move in new directions can be
harder in a digitally recorded world as your previous postings may make it
difficult.”).
126. See id. (“Comments, actions, or images once posted online may stay
long after you delete the material from your site.”).
127. See Mike Laurie, 7 Technologies Shaping the Future of Social Media,
MASHABLE (June 01, 2009), http://mashable.com/2009/06/01/social-media-futuretech/#CkzzzOK3EkqA (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (discussing new technologies
and that by “2019, when you look back at the social media landscape ten years
earlier, you might laugh at how hard you had to work”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
128. See The Impact of Technology on Your Social Media, DIGITALSOLUTIONS,
http://ds6.net/the-impact-of-technology-on-your-social-media/ (last visited Mar.
4, 2017) (comparing an iPhone with an eight megapixel camera to a Nokia
Lumia 1020 that boasts a forty-one megapixel camera) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
129. See Golliver, supra note 101 (detailing how Donald Sterling did not
want his ex-girlfriend to associate with black people and bring them to the
basketball games).
130. See Tom de Castella, Five Ways the Digital Camera Changed Us, BBC
(Feb. 28, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-16483509 (last visited Mar.
4, 2017) (explaining that the advent of the smartphone “brought digital
photography to the masses” and allowed people to take large numbers of
pictures at “almost no consequence or cost”) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
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fiancée by an elevator security camera. 131 Rice subsequently lost
an endorsement deal with sports equipment company
Vertimax. 132
3. Businesses’ Increased Political and Values-Based Engagement
Increasingly, companies are involved in political speech and
expressing specific values of their own. 133 They are highly
engaged in the political process and have a constitutionally
protected right to their corporate identities. 134 Like members of
the general public, they can be conservative or liberal, religious or
secular. Naturally then, those companies seek employees and
partners that will fall in line with those views and values and
want to be able to cut ties with those who contradict them. 135
Unlike the political correctness movement, which is
consistently socially liberal, 136 businesses fall all over the
131. See Daniel Roberts & Benjamin Snyder, Ray Rice and 11 Other Athletes
(Sept.
20,
2014),
Who
Lost
Their
Endorsements,
FORTUNE
http://fortune.com/2014/09/20/ray-rice-adrian-peterson-tiger-woods-athletes-drop
ped-endorsements/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“TMZ released video of Rice
hitting his fiancé. It set off the floodgates. Dick’s Sporting Goods and Modell’s
pulled his jerseys from stores. The next day, Nike said it would end its
endorsement, and EA Sports said it would scrub Rice from the Madden NFL 15
video game.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
132. Id.
133. See Leighton Walter Kille, Corporate Speech and the First Amendment:
RESOURCE,
History,
Data
and
Implications,
JOURNALIST’S
http://journalistsresource.org/studies/politics/finance-lobbying/corporate-speechfirst-amendment-history-data-implications (last updated Mar. 26, 2015) (last
visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“While the First Amendment was intended to protect
individual freedom of religion, speech and assembly, as well as a free press,
corporations have begun to displace individuals as its direct beneficiaries. This
‘shift from individual to business First Amendment cases is recent but
accelerating.’”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
134. See Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010)
(finding unconstitutional a federal law that prohibited independent corporate
expenditures for electioneering).
135. See Will Staney, How to Hire People Who Fit a Company’s Culture,
ENTREPRENEUR (Sept. 2, 2014), https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/236975
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Hiring employees who understand and exemplify
company values serves to reinforce the organization’s mission and vision . . . .”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
136. See Amanda Hess, How ‘Political Correctness’ Went from Punch Line to
Panic, N.Y. TIMES, (July 19, 2016) http://www.nytimes.com/2016/07/24/
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spectrum with regard to social issues. 137 One particularly
well-known example is fast-food chain Chick-fil-A, which has
long been known for its conservative leanings and traditional
stance on marriage—although the company has recently
strived to soften its appearance. 138 Similarly, in 2014, arts and
crafts retailer Hobby Lobby went to the United States Supreme
Court to defend its refusal to provide contraceptives to
employees in accordance with the company’s religious
beliefs. 139 Being that most morality clauses are broad and
subject to significant interpretation, 140 socially conservative
organizations such as these might use such a clause to break
ties with the maker of socially progressive speech. 141
Meanwhile, a company with opposing views could use an
identical clause to distance itself from a speaker advocating for
traditional marriage laws or some similarly right-wing
magazine/how-political-correctness-went-from-punch-line-to-panic.html?r=0
(last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (describing the political correctness movement as a
“shorthand for liberal politics”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
137. See Peter Gasca, Businesses Must Make a Stand on Important Social
Issues, ENTREPRENEUR, (Apr. 20, 2016) https://www.entrepreneur.com/article
/274335 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (noticing that “corporations have been taking
a larger role in supporting and influencing popular social ideas”) (on file with
the Washington and Lee Law Review).
138. See Bruce Horovitz, Chick-fil-A Wings in New Direction After Gay Flap,
USA TODAY (Apr. 7, 2014, 7:07 PM), http://www.usatoday.com/
story/money/business/2014/04/07/chick-fil-a-fast-food-dan-cathy/7250871/ (last
updated Apr. 8, 2017, 2:53 PM) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“It wants to go from
old school to almost cool. It wants to evolve from a place where gays once
picketed to a place where they’ll feel comfortable going to eat.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
139. See Burwell v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc. 134 S. Ct. 2751, 2785 (2014)
(finding by a five-to-four majority that the Religious Freedom Restoration Act
allows a for-profit employer to deny employees contraceptives to which they
would otherwise be entitled under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act of 2010 based on religious convictions).
140. See Matthew Philips, Morals Clauses and Ms. Spears, NEWSWEEK (Dec.
19, 2007, 7:00 PM) http://www.newsweek.com/morals-clauses-and-ms-spears94295 (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (indicating that morality clauses “usually fall
along the vague lines”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
141. See MICHAEL P. ZWEIG, 11 BUSINESS AND COMMERCIAL LITIGATION IN
FEDERAL COURTS §126:46 (3d ed. 2015) (noting that a morality clause “typically
gives the employer the right to terminate the contract or otherwise sanction the
[employee] if the individual behaves in a way that . . . damages the image of the
employer by association”).
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position. On Valentine’s Day 2016, sportswear brand Adidas
shared a photo on social media featuring two woman wearing
Adidas shoes with the caption, “The love you take is equal to
the love you make.” 142 Adidas is thus one of many American
companies that have taken a stand in favor of sexual
orientation equality. 143 As discussed, Nike recently broke ties
with Manny Pacquiao over his comments against same-sex
couples, 144 and Adidas would likely use a morality clause in the
same way.
Regardless of the political position or values that a
company adopts, such a company is highly motivated to act in
accordance with that position and would want the power to do
so in a contractual relationship. 145 In sum, the resurgence of
political correctness, 146 the advent of social media, 147 and the

142. See Dominique Mosbergen, Adidas Shuts Down Homophobic
Commenters in the Best Way Possible, HUFFINGTON POST (Feb. 18, 2016, 2:24
AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/adidas-valentines-day-ad-same-sexcouple_us_56c56250e4b08ffac127b0eb (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“After
attracting controversy for an ad featuring a same-sex couple, Adidas responded
to haters with an unequivocal message: Love is love.”) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
143. See Phil Wahba, Corporate America Comes Out Swinging Against
(Mar.
31,
2015),
‘Religious
Freedom’
Laws,
FORTUNE
http://fortune.com/2015/03/31/corporate-america-religious-freedom/ (last visited
Mar. 4, 2017) (“The recently passed ‘religious freedom’ law in Indiana has
elicited an unprecedented torrent of criticism of major companies, from Apple
and Marriott International to Indianapolis-based Eli Lilly and Angies List.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
144. See Rovell, Nike Cuts Ties with Manny Pacquiao, supra note 77
(reporting that Nike terminated its endorsement contract with Manny Pacquiao
because of homophobic remarks).
145. See Lou Gerstner, The Culture Ate Our Corporate Reputation, WALL ST.
J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/the-culture-ate-our-corporate-reputation-147544
5084 (last updated Oct. 2, 2016, 6:29 PM) (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (suggesting
that corporations have an interest in ensuring that employees are adhering to a
company’s culture) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
146. See Chait, Not a Very P.C. Thing to Say, supra note 92 (“After political
correctness burst onto the academic scene in the late ‘80s and early ‘90s, it went
into a long remission. Now it has returned.”).
147. See Simeon Edosomwan et al., The History of Social Media and Its
Impact on Business, 16 J. APPLIED MGMT. & ENTREPRENEURSHIP 79, 79 (2011)
(explaining that many social media websites were created in the 1990s and
2000s).
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escalation of company values 148 have all fueled the popularity
of the morality clause.
III. Legal and Policy Challenges to Morality Clauses
Since the days of Blackstone, 149 the cornerstone of contract
law is that a competent person may make her own bargain. 150
Under common law, “[t]he general rule is that competent
persons shall have the utmost liberty of contracting and that
their agreements voluntarily and fairly made shall be held
valid and enforced in the courts.” 151 Thus, freedom of contract
doctrine provides people with the ability to bargain away
rights to which they would otherwise be entitled. 152
However, the freedom of contract has its limitations. 153 The
Restatement provides that some agreements are unenforceable
to ensure elemental fairness, protect weaker parties, and
secure social order. 154 Contracts lacking in mutual assent or
consideration are void. 155 Agreements are unenforceable when
either party lacks capacity, 156 they are tinged with
148. See David Mielach, Strong Company Culture Predicts Long-Term
NEWS
DAILY
(May
31,
2013,
10:35
AM),
Success,
BUS.
http://www.businessnewsdaily.com/4568-company-culture-benefits.html
(last
visited Mar. 4, 2017) (revealing that “[c]ompanies that focus on company culture
may create not only a positive work environment; new data has also found that
those companies are also setting themselves up for long-term success”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
149. See 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *442–49 (discussing the
ability of a person to enter an agreement as long as that person has sufficient
ability to make such a contract).
150. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 1–3 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(defining what makes a contract).
151. Twin City Pipe Line Co. v. Harding Glass Co., 283 U.S. 353, 356 (1931).
152. See Robert Braucher, Freedom of Contract and the Second Restatement,
78 YALE L.J. 598, 599–600 (1969) (describing how the term bargain in contract
law means “an agreement to exchange”).
153. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 17 cmt. b (AM. LAW INST.
1981) (“The governing principle in the typical case is that bargains are
enforceable unless some other principle conflicts.”).
154. See id. § 178(1) (setting forth that a term of a contract will be
unenforceable on public policy grounds if the legislator so chooses or enforcing
the contract is “clearly outweighed in the circumstances by a public policy”).
155. Id. § 17.
156. Id. § 12(1).
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unconscionability 157 or illegality, 158 and when the contract is
against public policy. 159
Non-competes are one such example. 160 For reasons of public
policy, the law limits the enforceability of covenants not to
compete, 161 in which an often-weaker party agrees not to
participate in a competing business at the end of a business
relationship. 162 When not entirely prohibited by law, 163
non-compete agreements are enforceable only if the restrictions
imposed are reasonably necessary for the protection of the
employer. 164 A restrictive covenant must also: (1) provide a
reasonable time limit; (2) provide a reasonable territorial limit;
(3) not be too harsh or oppressive on the employee; and (4) not be
contrary to public policy. 165

157. See Melissa T. Lonegrass, Finding Room for Fairness in Formalism:
The Sliding Scale Approach to Unconscionability, 44 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 1, 9–11
(2012) (exploring both procedural and substantive unconscionability and
pointing out that both are needed to invalidate a contract).
158. See Party’s Unlawful Acts in Performance Held to Bar His Recovery
Under a Lawful Contract, 61 COLUM. L. REV. 119, 120 (1961) (“As a general
principle, courts will not enforce illegal bargains.”).
159. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 178 (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
160. See, e.g., Valley Med. Specialists v. Farber, 982 P.2d 1277, 1278 (Ariz.
1999) (concluding that a covenant not to compete will not be enforced against a
physician on public policy grounds).
161. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS, § 188 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(specifying the factors that need to bet met for non-competes to be enforced).
162. See Michael Sean Quinn & Andrea Levin, Post Employment Agreements
Not to Compete: A Texas Odyssey, 33 TEX. J. BUS. L. 71, 73 (1996) (arguing that
“enforcing covenants not to compete does not allow the weaker employee to play
on the same field as the stronger employer”).
163. See Hui Shangguan, A Comparative Study of Non-Compete Agreements
for Trade Secret Protection in the United States and China, 11 WASH. J.L. TECH.
& ARTS 405, 411 n.28 (2016) (listing California, Hawaii, North Dakota, Montana,
and Oklahoma as states that prohibit non-compete agreements altogether); id.
(“Montana and Oklahoma permit the enforcement of non-competes in certain
circumstances, while Colorado and Oregon limit non-competes to managers and
professional workers.”).
164. See Lakeside Oil Co. v. Slutsky, 98 N.W.2d 415, 419 (Wis. 1959)
(explaining that “the rule requires that a restrictive covenant not to compete
after a term of employment should be reasonably necessary for the protection of
the legitimate interests of the employer”).
165. See id. at 418–21 (setting forth the requirements that must be met for a
restrictive covenant to be valid).
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Courts have traditionally analyzed non-competes closely
along these analytical lines because of their effects on employee
mobility and freedom. 166 Where they were initially designed for
high-level employees and company founders, businesses have
broadened their reach to lower-level, low-wage, and entry-level
employees, 167 including sandwich-makers, 168 hairstylists, 169
sanitation workers, 170 and camp counselors. 171 This expansion
166. See Maureen B. Callahan, Comment. Post-Employment Restraint
Agreements: A Reassessment, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 703, 705–06 (1985) (advancing
that courts historically have justified examining non-compete agreements on
three grounds: restrictions on the mobility of skilled workers, employee
sophistication, and removal of a productive person from the work force).
167. See Lydia DePillis, The Rise of the Non-Compete Agreement, from Tech
WASH.
POST
(Feb.
21,
2015),
Workers
to
Sandwich
Makers,
https://www.washingtonpost.com/
news/wonk/wp/2015/02/21/the-rise-of-the-noncompete-agreement-from-tech-workers- to-sandwich-makers/ (last visited Mar. 4,
2017) (noticing that non-competes are normally reserved for executives but
lately they have been “popping up in more and more low-wage sectors too”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
168. A 2014 press report found that sandwich chain Jimmy John’s required
its sandwich makers and delivery drivers to sign non-compete agreements. The
non-compete agreements prohibited sandwich makers, for a period of two years
after leaving a job with Jimmy John’s, from working at any establishment
within a two-mile radius of a Jimmy John’s location that made more than 10%
of its revenue from sandwiches. In 2016, the company entered into an
agreement with New York’s Attorney General to cease the use of the contract in
New York. Press Release, Eric T. Schneiderman, N.Y. Attorney Gen. (June 22,
2016) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Samantha
Bomkamp, Illinois AG Sues Jimmy John’s Over Noncompete Pacts; Chain
‘Disappointed’, CHI. TRIB. (June 9, 2016, 9:59 AM), http://www.chicago
tribune.com/business/ct-jimmy-johns-illinois-lawsuit-0609-biz-20160608-story.
html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (observing that Illinois’s Attorney General also
filed suit against Jimmy John’s for the same reason) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
169. See King v. Head Start Family Hair Salons, Inc., 886 So.2d 769, 772
(Ala. 2004) (finding that a “noncompetition agreement prohibiting King from
working in the hair-care industry within a two-mile radius of any of Head
Start’s 30 locations is unduly burdensome”).
170. See DCS Sanitation Mgmt., Inc. v. Castillo, 435 F.3d 892, 897 (8th Cir.
2006) (concluding that the district court properly held that a non-compete
agreement against a sanitation worker was overly broad and unenforceable).
171. See Steven Greenhouse, Noncompete Clauses Increasingly Pop Up in
Array of Jobs, N.Y. TIMES (June 8, 2014), http://www.nytimes.
com/2014/06/09/business/noncompete-clauses-increasingly-pop-up-in-array-ofjobs.html?smid=pl-share (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (reporting that Colette
Buser, a summer camp counselor, signed a non-compete agreement that forbade
her from working at a competing camp within ten miles) (on file with the
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has caught the critical eyes of both state and federal legislatures,
and the White House, which has advocated for their further
restriction on public policy grounds. 172
In fact, morality clauses have much in common with
non-competes: they are often tangential to personal services
contracts; 173 they purport to protect the stronger party’s business
interests; 174 they restrain the subject’s rights; 175 they can be
aggressively broad and lacking in consideration; 176 and they may
sometimes be imposed in inherently-coercive settings. 177 Like
non-competes,
morality
clauses
have
experienced
a
democratization as of late. 178
However, unlike non-competes, morality clauses have thus
far escaped judicial scrutiny. They have not been the subject of
strict inquiry on legal or public policy grounds. In fact, other than
in the celebrity context, 179 they have been largely ignored. In
Washington and Lee Law Review).
172. See THE WHITE HOUSE, NON-COMPETE AGREEMENTS: ANALYSIS OF THE
USAGE, POTENTIAL ISSUES, AND STATE RESPONSES 3 (2016) (revealing that both
state and federal legislation is looking to further limit non-compete
agreements).
173. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 353 (pointing out that morality clauses in talent contracts have been
around since the 1920s).
174. See Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 235 (“[T]he
‘morals clause’ generally allows buyers, such as advertisers, to terminate a
talent agreement when an actor’s conduct is detrimental to the buyer’s interests
or otherwise devalues the performance due.”).
175. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 350 (“As a general proposition, talent needs to know that a morals clause is
powerful enough to impact important aspects of one’s career, ranging from one’s
compensation and continued employment to restrictions upon his or her
personal behavior.”).
176. See id. at 371 (describing how companies will try to include
broadly-worded morals clauses).
177. See Donald J. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, 49 AKRON
L. REV. 1, 53–54 (2016) [hereinafter Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private
Law] (contending that some employees that care about the restrictions imposed
by morality clauses still sign the employment contract because they need the
job).
178. See Taylor, III. et al., The Reverse Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 79–
80 (presenting the birth of the reverse-morals clause, which allows a celebrity to
bow out of a deal if the company engages in certain type of immoral behavior).
179. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 357–62 (examining seminal cases involving morality clauses and
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light of the increasing breadth and use of morality clauses across
many ranks, 180 the time is right to examine these restraints
closely, taking into account their potential legal failings and
adverse consequences on public policy grounds.
A. Mutual Assent and Definiteness
The law requires contractual terms to be reasonably certain
and definite. 181 That is, they must supply “a basis for determining
the existence of a breach and for giving an appropriate
remedy.” 182 This principle does not require absolute certainty;
rather, only the quantum that is “reasonable” under the
circumstances. 183 In general, ambiguous language will be
interpreted in favor of the non-drafting party. 184
Typically, both Bad Behavior and Reputational Impact
morality clauses are broad, indefinite, and at worst,
tautological. 185 A Bad Behavior clause might ban acts that just
generally offend notions of “decency” and “morality.” 186 Some
Reputational Impact clauses may be so indefinite as to be
illusory, effectively prohibiting any conduct that the enforcing
party deems to be unacceptable or potentially tarnishing. 187 Most
celebrities).
180. See DePillis, supra note 167 (reporting on the rise of morality clauses in
all areas of employment).
181. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981).
182. Id. § 33(2).
183. See id. § 33 cmt. a (explaining that for a contract to be enforceable the
terms of the contract need not be definitively certain).
184. See Raymond H. Srp, Survey of Ohio Law: 2011 Supreme Court of Ohio
Decisions: II. Contract Interpretation: A. Insurance Policies: Westfield Insurance
Co. v. Hunter, 38 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 1211, 1223 (2012) (“Both courts simply
interpreted an ambiguity in a contract by construing the language against the
drafting party.”).
185. See Philips, supra note 140 (observing morality clauses as “usually
fall[ing] along vague lines of not doing anything that might bring about public
disrepute, contempt, scandal or ridicule, or reflecting unfavorably on” the
company).
186. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 201–12 (pointing out that
the earliest morals clauses “contained triggers defined by notices of ‘decency’
and ‘morality’” (citations omitted)).
187. See id. at 213–18 (mentioning that disrepute triggers in morality
clauses give companies great latitude in determining when a morals clause is
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contracts do not define these vague terms, choosing to adopt
Justice Stewart’s “I-know-it-when-I see-it” standard. 188 By their
very nature, these concepts—and the behavior they ban—are
indistinct. 189 In practice, these concepts are relative to time,
place, and historical moment—often dependent on the code of
conduct currently acceptable to society. 190
Despite the obvious ambiguity and breadth of the actions
conceivably covered by a ban on generally immoral or even “bad”
behavior, courts have upheld even the most ambiguous morality
clauses. 191 In Knox-Pipes v. Genesee Intermediate School
District, 192 the plaintiff, who was terminated for conduct
involving moral turpitude, argued that because the term was not
defined, no legal obligation was created. 193 The court rejected the
argument, concluding that the dictionary definition of the term
could be used to ascertain the word’s plain and ordinary
meaning. 194 Similarly, in Nader v. ABC TV, Inc., 195 ABC
terminated a soap opera star’s contract pursuant to a morality
clause after he was arrested for selling cocaine to an undercover
police officer. 196 The morality clause at issue disallowed any
conduct that “might tend to reflect unfavorably on ABC” or any of
its sponsors, licensees, series, or programs. 197 In a breach of
breached).
188. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (defining “I know it when I see it” as the threshold test when
determining whether a motion picture is obscene under an Ohio statute that
convicted people for possessing and exhibiting an obscene film).
189. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 352 (“By their very nature, morals are subjective concepts . . . .”).
190. See id. (declaring that “[a]t the very least, moral behavior refers to
behavior that comports to an existing code of conduct put forward by society”).
191. See Nader v. ABC TV, Inc., 150 F. App’x. 54, 56 (2d Cir. 2005)
(pronouncing that ABC could fire the plaintiff, and the plaintiff’s claim that
ABC’s morality clause was unenforceable because of vagueness was not
supported).
192. No. 322295, 2015 WL 5657396 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 24, 2015), appeal
denied, 499 Mich. 915 (2016).
193. Id. at *8.
194. Id.
195. 330 F. Supp. 2d 345 (S.D.N.Y. 2004), aff’d, 150 F. App’x. 54 (2d Cir.
2005).
196. Nader,150 F. App’x. at 55.
197. Id. at 54.
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contract claim for wrongful termination, Nader argued that the
clause was “too ambiguous or vague,” and that his actions did not
fall within its confines. 198 The Second Circuit rejected this
argument and, in affirming the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, held that Nader’s arrest and the resulting media
attention brought his conduct “well within any reasonable
interpretation of the [morality] clause.” 199
Despite these examples, it is undisputed that a party needs
to know (either implicitly or expressly) what behavior or conduct
will trigger termination under a morality clause. 200 In Dias v.
Archdiocese of Cincinnati, 201 a Catholic school fired its technology
coordinator
for
becoming
pregnant
through
artificial
insemination. 202 The morality clause in her contract required the
employee to abide by Catholic doctrine, 203 even though she was a
non-ministerial employee. 204 In her suit for breach of contract, the
plaintiff claimed the morality clause was invalid and illegal
because it was a pretext for pregnancy discrimination. 205 The
court found that the contract lacked a “meeting of the minds”
because the clause did not address artificial insemination, and
there was a question of fact as to whether the plaintiff knew she
was barred from such action. 206

198. Id. at 56.
199. Id.
200. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 369–79 (discussing what talent needs to know about morality clauses).
201. No. 1:11-CV-00251, 2012 WL 1068165 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 29, 2012).
202. Id. at *1.
203. Id.
204. Id. at *8.
205. Id. at *2.
206. Id. at *6. But see Dias v. Archdiocese of Cincinnati, No. 1:11-CV-00251,
2013 WL 360355, at *1 n.1 (S.D. Ohio Jan. 30, 2013) (“Such clause stated
generally that Plaintiff would ‘comply with and act consistently in accordance
with the stated philosophy and teaching of the Roman Catholic Church.’”). In
addressing the parties’ subsequent cross motions for summary judgment, the
court did not address the plaintiff’s contract claim because it found she had
unclean hands. Although she did not know artificial insemination was
prohibited, she did know that homosexuality was, and she testified to keeping
her long-term homosexual relationship secret because she knew it was a breach
of her contract. See id. at *14 (determining the plaintiff knew this would be a
violation of the morals clause).
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Nonetheless, there is no shortage of highly ambiguous
morality clauses between employers and employees of all
levels. 207 Although the majority of employee contracts are not
publicly available, some published employee handbooks give
guidance as to the stances employers are taking. 208 In some
situations, courts have recognized these manuals as implied
contracts, which are binding upon employers. 209 Los Angeles
County, California, which employs over 100,000 people, 210 has
included the following clause in its employee handbook: “The rule
is simple, we are accountable for what we do—we do not engage
in any behavior that would compromise the County, or be an
embarrassment to the County.” 211 In a particularly outstanding
morality clause, Lee University requires all of its administration
and staff to “mirror a Christ-like example for students on a daily
basis,” while refraining from “homosexual practices and other
forms of sexual behavior which violate Scripture.” 212 Schools,
universities, religious institutions, and other non-profit
organizations all regularly include morality provisions in
207. See supra notes 167–171, 191 (highlighting that low-level employees
and actors both sign contracts that contain morality clauses).
208. See Mike the Inkman, Hobby Lobby Adds ‘Abstinence Policy’ To
Employee Handbooks, EMPIRE NEWS, http://empirenews.net/hobby-lobby-addsabstinence-policy-to-employee-handbooks/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Hobby
Lobby . . . announced that they are adding new rule to their ‘Employee Code of
Conduct,’ which will now include a passage that says the company expects all of
their non-married workers to practice abstinence.”) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
209. See Rachel Leiser Levy, Comment, Judicial Interpretation of Employee
Handbooks: The Creation of a Common Law Information-Eliciting Penalty
Default Rule, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 695, 701 (2005) [hereinafter Levy, Judicial
Interpretation] (“Beginning in the early 1980s, however, virtually every state
supreme court reconsidered its treatment of employee handbooks and concluded
that under the right conditions a handbook could be transformed into a
unilateral contract.”).
210. LA County Employees, CTY. OF L.A. http://portal.lacounty.
gov/wps/portal/!ut/p/b0/04_Sj9CPykssy0xPLMnMz0vMAfGjzOItDCDAyMIk0M3
AyMfVItTT1NjIINRAvyDbUREACWv94w!!/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
211. CTY. OF LOS ANGELES, EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 24 (2003),
http://file.lacounty.gov/SDSInter/lac/113484_Employee_Handbook.pdf.
212. LEE UNIVERSITY, ADMINISTRATIVE/SUPPORT STAFF HANDBOOK 14 (2015),
https://www.leeuniversity.edu/uploadedFiles/Content/human-resources/staff-hand
book.pdf.
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employment contracts. 213 Clauses like these give an employer
tremendous discretion in determining whether an employee’s
conduct was “Christ-like” or “embarrassing.” 214
B. Subjective Enforcement and Bad Faith
The question of whether a morality clause correctly triggers
termination is one of fact, premised upon the clause’s language
and whether the allegedly offending behavior falls within its
ambit. 215 As discussed above, the breadth of morality clauses
encompasses wide-ranging behaviors that are often ill-defined. 216
Given the inherent ambiguity, how can courts distinguish
exacting, and perhaps prudish, enforcers from those using
morality clauses as a pretext to act in bad faith?
With Bad Behavior clauses, courts have the unenviable task
of assessing whether the behavior is normatively offensive
enough to the community to trigger a contractual discharge. 217
Courts commonly make these fact-intensive assessments in other
areas of law, such as obscenity, 218 privacy, 219 and tort law
213. Smythe, Liberty at the Borders of Private Law, supra note 177, at 57.
214. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 202 (“Given the vast
universe of conduct this definition [of morality] might encompass, non-talent
had exceedingly broad latitude to determine when talent’s conduct failed to
meet the standard set by the contemporaneous society.”).
215. See Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 245
(“Determining whether an express morals clause is breached is a question of fact
dependent upon the wording of the morals clause and the conduct at issue.”).
216. See supra notes 185–190 and accompanying text (defining types of
morality clauses and the broad conduct they seek to regulate).
217. See Kressler, Using the Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 246
(highlighting that under California and New York law, a breach of an express
morals clause is proper when an “actor’s conduct is viewed by a large segment of
the public as shocking, insulting or offensive”).
218. See Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 187 (1964) (“We are told that the
determination whether a particular motion picture, book, or other work of
expression is obscene can be treated as a purely factual judgment on which a
jury’s verdict is all but conclusive . . . .”).
219. See JULIA LANE, VICTORIA STODDEN, STEFAN BENDER & HELEN
NISSENBAUM, PRIVACY, BIG DATA, AND THE PUBLIC GOOD 9 (2014) (clarifying that
privacy law in the realm of intrusion upon seclusion and the public disclosure of
private facts is a factual determination based on the activities of “both subjects
and acquirers of personal information”).
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(emotional distress cases). 220 In the case of Reputational Impact
clauses, the assessment of a breach often depends on public
perception and awareness, which is less subjective but no less
slippery a concept. 221
For instance, in the 2012 case of Mendenhall v.
Hanesbrands, 222 a North Carolina district court had to determine
if an athlete’s tweets plausibly caused sufficient uproar to cancel
an endorsement deal. 223 There, former Pittsburg Steelers running
back Rashard Mendenhall entered into an agreement with
clothing manufacturer Hanesbrands, Inc., in which he promised
to promote the company’s athletic apparel branded Champion
Apparel. 224 The agreement included the following clause:
If Mendenhall commits or is arrested for any crime or becomes
involved in any situation or occurrence . . . tending to bring
Mendenhall into public disrepute, contempt, scandal, or
ridicule, or tending to shock, insult or offend the majority of
the consuming public or any protected class or group thereof,
then [Hanes] shall have the right to immediately terminate
this Agreement. 225

Mendenhall was an active user of the social media platform,
Twitter, where he commonly expressed views on many issues
ranging from Islam to parenting. 226 At one point he even
compared the NFL to the slave trade. 227 Hanesbrands never
commented on Mendenhall’s tweets, nor did it ask him to limit
his controversial comments. 228 When President Barack Obama
announced the death of Osama bin Laden, Mendenhall posted
220. See Richard W. Wright, Causation in Tort Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1735,
1741 (1985) (discussing that causation in tort law is a factual inquiry).
221. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 214–15 (“The Court of
Arbitration for Sport (CAS) . . . has defined bringing a person into disrepute as
lowering the reputation of the person in the eyes of ordinary members of the
public to a significant extent.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
222. 856 F. Supp. 2d 717 (M.D.N.C. 2012).
223. See id. at 727–28 (denying Hanesbrands’ motion for summary judgment
and finding that there was a dispute of facts that existed between the parties to
the public’s response to Mendenhall’s tweets).
224. Id. at 719.
225. Id. at 720.
226. Id.
227. Id.
228. Id.
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various comments on Twitter. 229 One such tweet read, “What
kind of person celebrates death? It’s amazing how people can
HATE a man they never even heard speak. We’ve only heard one
side.” 230
Within two weeks, Hanes terminated Mendenhall’s
agreement pursuant to the morality clause and issued a
statement on ESPN that it did not agree with his controversial,
but legitimately-held, beliefs. 231
Mendenhall brought a claim for breach of contract, and
Hanes later moved for judgment on the pleadings. 232 Interpreting
the clause narrowly, the court concluded that Mendenhall could
be terminated only if he created a public scandal, as specified by
the agreement. 233 Because the pleadings alone did not establish
any actual scandal and even included facts suggesting that the
comments garnered some positive responses, the court denied
Hanes’s motion. 234 However, in ruling as such, the court simply
found that discovery was necessary to determine whether Hanes
could prove that Mendenhall’s statements did create a scandal. 235
The parties settled prior to any further ruling. 236
If employers and other contracting parties are given
unlimited discretion to interpret broad, all-encompassing morals
clauses, they could quite easily use these clauses to terminate an
economically disappointing relationship under the pretense of
moral objection. Consider a situation in which a company enters
into a two-year contract with an independent marketing
consultant, hoping for a large increase in profits. Therein, the
consultant agrees to a broad morality clause prohibiting, among
other things, “all behavior likely to offend the company’s
229. Id. at 720–21.
230. Id. at 721.
231. Id.
232. Id. at 719.
233. Id. at 726.
234. Id.
235. Id. at 727–28.
236. Marc Edelman, Rashard Mendenhall Settles Lawsuit with
Hanesbrands Over Morals Clause, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2013, 12:02 PM)
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/01/17/rashard-mendenhall-settleslawsuit-with-hanesbrands-over-morals-clause/#16a1021c6c87 (last visited Mar.
4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review)
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customers.” Although the consultant performs as promised, after
six months, the company realizes that returns have been modest.
The company subsequently discovers that the consultant recently
made an insensitive comment regarding affirmative action on an
online political forum. Should the retailer now be entitled to
terminate the agreement? And should the law permit contract
language that is so clearly ripe for abuse? That is, with such
unlimited discretion to terminate an agreement, has the
contracting party really bound itself to anything at all? Situations
like these illustrate the lack of predictability surrounding the
broadly-drafted morality clauses seen in so many modern
agreements. 237 In this way, such clauses essentially grant a blank
check for abuse by the imposing party. 238
C. Concerns of Free Speech and Expression
Broad morality clauses chill speech and free expression, 239
particularly when applied expansively through all levels of
employees and corporate partners. And these repercussions could
be significant. 240 If all of the Fortune 500 companies were to bind
their employees and agents to morality clauses, the speech and
behavior of over 17% of the nation’s workforce would be
constrained and controlled. 241 At first blush, forcing almost a fifth
237. See supra notes 167–171, 191 and accompanying text (observing the
growing trend of morality clauses in employment contracts).
238. See supra notes 140–141 and accompanying text (contending that broad
morality clauses give employers the right to unilaterally terminate an
employment contract).
239. See Patricia Sánchez Abril, Avner Levin & Alissa Del Riego, Blurred
Boundaries: Social Media Privacy and the Twenty-First-Century Employee, 49
AM. BUS. L.J. 63, 90 (2012) (“Employer restrictions on off-duty speech and
conduct are troubling in that they squelch expression and individual autonomy
and may compromise the employee’s right to a private life . . . .”).
240. See Marka B. Fleming, Amanda Harmon Cooley & Gwendolyn
McFadden-Wade, Morals Clauses for Educators in Secondary and Postsecondary
Schools: Legal Applications and Constitutional Concerns, 2009 BYU EDUC. &
L.J. 67, 67–68 (noting that discipline for violation of a morality clause by a
teacher can result in suspension or revocation of a teaching certificate).
241. Claire Zillman & Stacy Jones, 7 Fortune 500 Companies with the Most
Employees, FORTUNE (June 13, 2015, 10:00 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/13/
fortune-500-most-employees/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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of the country to behave in accordance with the prevailing social
norms would not be harmful. However, the consequences can be
ill and far-reaching.
If the clauses used in the hypothetical were Bad Behavior
clauses, 17% of American workers would then be required to keep
both their on and off-duty actions in line with the undefined and
ever-changing public morals and social norms. 242 A large portion
of the populous would thus be held to perpetual, innocuous
boardroom behavior. The result would be widespread uniformity
and a significant reduction of free expression and challenges to
the status quo. Similarly, if those same businesses imposed
Reputational Impact clauses, employees would all need to refrain
from offending the community at large. 243 One could therefore
expect the same result under either clause, both of which would
essentially serve as a ban on unpopular speech. 244
To be clear, most American workers are employed on an
at-will basis outside of any express contract. 245 The at-will
doctrine relies on the assumption that absent a contract
specifically stating otherwise, an employment relationship is
mutually consensual, and an employee may resign or be
terminated at any time for any or no reason without liability to
either party, unless an enumerated statutory or judicially-created
exception applies. 246 Courts have long examined cases in which
242. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 352 (arguing that morality clauses are largely governed by the prevailing
societal values at the time).
243. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 213–19 (discussing how
Reputational Impact morality clauses usually ban conduct by an employee that
brings disrepute as perceived in the public eye to a company).
244. See Fleming, Cooley & McFadden-Wade, supra note 240, at 89
(specifying that the freedom of speech is implicated in cases enforcing morals
clauses on teachers).
245. See The At-Will Presumption and Exceptions to the Rule, NAT’L CONF.
ST. LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/labor-and-employment/at-willemployment-overview.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Employment
relationships are presumed to be ‘at-will’ in all U.S. states except Montana.”) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
246. See Stanley J. Brown & Henry Morris, Jr., Employment at Will, 10
DISTRICT LAW. 42, 42 (1985) (mentioning that “[u]nder the traditional
‘employment-at-will’ doctrine, employers had an absolute right to terminate
their employees absent violation of a statute” and further noting that many
state courts have recently found exceptions to the “at-will” rule).
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at-will employees seek relief for termination based on their
speech, and those courts have generally found that free speech
protection is guaranteed only from government and not private
employers. 247 With regard to employees under contract, however,
a morality clause should not serve as a “get out of jail free card,”
turning a contractual relationship into at-will employment 248 and
here, courts should consider how the unfettered use of broad
morality clauses can significantly chill free expression.
Admittedly, some states do already impose some limits on
how much an employer can intrude on the off-duty actions of an
employee. 249 For instance, sixteen states and the District of
Columbia have enacted statutes prohibiting employers from
punishing employees for off-duty tobacco use. 250 Meanwhile, eight
states protect employees’ use of any legal products, and four
states protect all legal off-duty activities. 251 However, these latter
247. See Griffith v. Bell-Whitley Cmty. Action Agency, 614 F.2d 1102, 1110
(6th Cir. 1980) (applying Kentucky law to dismiss employee’s claims against
their employer when they were discharged for opposing the election of a certain
individual as the agency’s executive director); Korb v. Raytheon Corp., 574
N.E.2d 370, 372–73 (Mass. 1991) (concluding that an employee’s free speech
rights did not protect him from discharge when he spoke out against his
company’s economic interests); Shovelin v. Cent. N.M. Elec. Coop., Inc., 850 P.2d
996, 1009–10 (N.M. 1993) (finding that an employer did not violate an
employee’s free speech rights when it terminated him for running for local
office); Charles Glick, Note, Free Speech, the Private Employee, and State
Constitutions, 91 YALE L.J. 522, 525–26 (1982) (pointing out that neither the
common law nor statutes provide freedom of speech protections for employees).
But see Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898–99 (3d Cir. 1983)
(administering Pennsylvania law to find that when an employer terminated an
employee for refusing to lobby state congress in favor of no-fault insurance
reform, the employee could establish a case for wrongful discharge, as the
termination violated a recognized public policy created by the First
Amendment).
248. Even with regard to at-will employees, an employer may be bound to
the terms of a morality clause included in an employee handbook or code of
conduct. See Levy, Judicial Interpretation, supra note 209, at 696 (explaining
that the terms of an employee handbook can form an implied contract between
an employer and an employee).
249. See Kayleigh McNelis, Off-Duty Statutes and Social Media: The Need
for Protection Regardless of Whether Speech Is Concerted, 33 REV. LITIG. 219,
237–42 (2014) (listing and analyzing states that have off-duty statutes that
protect employees).
250. Id. at 237.
251. Id.
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statutes are drafted somewhat vaguely and have been applied
quite narrowly. 252
As to speech specifically, the National Labor Relations Board
has held that concerted complaints about an employer (those
made with an intention to enact change) on social media may be
protected. 253 Thus, an employer may not make a broad rule
prohibiting all negative speech against an employer, which would
necessarily include protected concerted activity. 254 The problem
with these limited protections, however, is that they do little to
protect employees and other contracting parties from the
potential abuses discussed above. 255 Essentially, unless the
employee is protesting her employer 256 or smoking a cigarette, 257
she is on her own.
D. Bargaining Power and Unilaterality
The typical justification for a morality clause is preventative:
businesses want to avoid any situation in which their associates
embarrass them or tarnish their products. 258 Additionally, in
such an event, they want a solid justification to terminate the

252. See id. at 240–42 (noticing that a New York court interpreted their
off-duty statute narrowly and that Colorado’s off-duty statute is overly vague).
253. See id. at 229 (“In recent years, the NLRB has extended further
protection to employees making online comments about work.”).
254. See id. at 226–27 (declaring that the NLRA restricts an employer’s
right to restrict an employee’s concerted speech efforts).
255. See Fleming, Cooley & McFadden-Wade, supra note 240, at 67–68 (“In
general, morals clauses in employment contracts allow an employer to terminate
employment when an employee’s conduct is potentially detrimental to the
employer’s interest.”).
256. See McNelis, supra note 249, at 227 (“[T]he employer must ensure the
company’s social media policy is carefully crafted to prevent discriminatory
conduct and unauthorized revelations without ‘chilling’ speech to which
employees have a right under the NLRA.”).
257. See id. at 237 (writing that a certain level of protection is offered to
employees in states that have off-duty statutes that prevent employers from
discriminating against the use of tobacco).
258. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 352 (“The underlying purpose of a morals clause in an agreement is to
protect the contracting company . . . .”).
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offending associate—whether it is an employee, an independent
contractor, or a business partner. 259
Nonetheless, the ambiguous nature of many morality clauses
combined with their presentation in the context of unequal
bargaining power may lead to situations in which the weaker
party accepts without knowing the boundaries of the prohibited
behavior or, perhaps more commonly, accepts without knowing
the implications or intended enforcement of the clause. 260
Research in the area of non-competes suggests that the
overwhelming majority of employees blindly accept employment
restrictions without front-end negotiation or understanding of
their potential implications. 261 The same is likely true for
morality clauses, whose inherent ambiguity lends them to
confusion.
Moreover, most morality clauses do not provide a mutuality
of obligation. 262 In the majority of clauses canvassed, the business
imposed a duty on the other contracting party, but the duty to be
moral, or more specifically, the duty to refrain from embarrassing
was not reciprocal. 263 Consider a situation in which a business is
tainted by massive recall or a corporate scandal. It is foreseeable
259. See ZWEIG, supra note 141 (divulging that morality clauses usually
allows the employer to unilaterally terminate a contract if an employee’s acts in
a way that damages the employer).
260. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 352 (unveiling that morality clauses are highly subjective).
261. See OFFICE OF ECON. POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, NON-COMPETE
CONTRACTS: ECONOMIC EFFECTS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS 13 (2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/economic-policy/Documents/UST%20
Non-competes%20Report.pdf (“[O]nly 10% of workers with non-competes report
bargaining over their non-compete, with 38% of the non-bargainers not realizing
that they could even negotiate.”).
262. See Oliver Herzfeld, Why Jay-Z and Other Talent Should Seek Morals
Clause Mutuality, FORBES (Jan. 2, 2014, 9:24 AM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/oliverherzfeld/2014/01/02/why-jay-z-and-other-talent-should-seek-moralsclause-mutuality (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (asserting that with the rise of
corporate scandals high-profile people should seek a reverse morals clause) (on
file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
263. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
6, at 353–57 (outlining various contracts with morality clauses). But see Taylor,
III. et al., The Reverse-Morals Clause, supra note 6, at 80 (clarifying that in
some high-profile agreements, individuals have negotiated for “reverse-morals
clauses,” protecting them from the bad actions of the company, but these clauses
are less common than traditional morality clauses and likely require high
bargaining power).
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that an endorser or even an employee would want to sever ties
with the company based on its diminished reputation. 264 In most
morality clauses today, a company can terminate an agent for bad
behavior, but the individual cannot do the same. 265 As a result,
the stronger parties benefit from morality clauses in that they
can control the other party’s behavior and terminate for a broad
and vague range of reasons, but the other party receives no
benefit. 266
Due to the lack of mutuality, many morality clauses,
standing alone, may be void for lack of consideration. 267
Consideration may also be lacking when the clause contains a
promise to perform an existing legal obligation, or to forgo
illegality. 268 The pre-existing duty rule holds that a promise to do
what one is legally obligated to do is not valid consideration. 269
The rule is grounded in the notion that courts will not suppose
that the promisor had any alternative but to conform to the law,
and that therefore his promise to do so involves no detriment or
forbearance.
E. Privacy Rights
By their very nature, Bad Behavior clauses restrict some
legal acts that are deemed private. 270 Assessing their breach will
264. See Herzfeld, supra note 262 (highlighting several examples of
corporate scandals).
265. See id. (setting forth that there is a need for reverse morality clauses in
which a high profit person can hold a company accountable for immoral
behavior).
266. See Epstein, An Exploration of Interesting Clauses in Sports, supra note
6 at 75 (“[A] morals clause allows the contracting company to swiftly sever its
relationship with troublesome talent . . . .”).
267. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 71 (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(instructing that the formation of a contract requires an exchange of
consideration).
268. See id. § 73 (“Performance of a legal duty owed to a promisor which is
neither doubtful nor the subject of honest dispute is not consideration . . . .”).
269. See Edwin W. Patterson, An Apology for Consideration, 58 COLUM. L.
REV. 929, 938 (1958) (“The rule that the consideration for a promise cannot be
legally sufficient if it consists merely of the performance of, or a promise to
perform, a pre-existing contractual duty to a third person is likewise
indefensible as a part of the doctrine of consideration.”).
270. See Czarnota, supra note 6, at 461–62 (discussing implicit waiver of
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also necessarily involve intrusion into the subject’s private life. 271
Did the athlete commit adultery? Did the employee post a racist
meme on his private Facebook page? Did the donor have a
substance abuse problem?
Although the spirit of morality clauses prevents the ill-effects
of a negative association, on their face many Bad Behavior
clauses prohibit off-duty conduct and speech regardless of
ensuing public impact. 272 It is not inconceivable that an employer,
acting on rumor or suspicion or nothing at all, could peer into the
private life of an employee to search for something “objectionable”
to toll the morality clause. Recall the use of social media
background checks discussed above. 273 In light of the breadth of
most morality clauses, he who seeks will likely find some skeleton
to trigger the morality clause in most cases. Allowing powerful
contracting parties—especially employers—unfettered access into
the lives of others is unsound policy.
Reputational Impact clauses, on the other hand, may be less
invasive because they are premised on the notion that the
offending act is public or otherwise known. This will certainly
affect non-public figures more than public ones, as the law is
clear that anything that occurs in the public eye is not private. At
least one scholar has argued that it is an open question whether
traditionally-worded morality clauses contain an implicit waiver
of privacy rights. 274
Although they purport to limit immoral behavior and protect
reputation—which at first glance are good things—morality
clauses can be socially harmful and should be duly scrutinized.
The following section offers a framework for their analysis that
balances their legitimate justifications against their potential for
abuse.

privacy rights by athletes).
271. See id. at 462 (considering public prying into personal lives of athletes).
272. See Katz, Note, Reputations, supra note 6, at 209–11 (describing the
exceedingly low bar required to breach a morals requirement).
273. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing social media background checks).
274. See id. at 471 (noting it remains unsettled whether morality clauses
carry express or implied waivers of privacy).
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IV. A Model Test for Morality Clauses

Scrutiny of morality clauses will necessarily involve a
two-step determination. First, courts should analyze the clause
itself to see if it is enforceable. Morality clauses might be deemed
unenforceable for vagueness, lack of consideration, duress, or any
other contract fault. 275 We contend that they should also be
vetted for public policy considerations, such as restraint on legal
speech and the burden on the promisee. Second, courts must
determine whether, in the case of an otherwise enforceable
morality clause, such clause was violated by the acts of the
allegedly offending party. This is a highly subjective assessment,
involving a keen understanding of dominant mores, the impact
(or foreseeability of the impact) of the offending behavior, and the
terminating party’s true intent.
Because the determination of the validity and applicability of
morality clauses is fraught with legal, normative, and moral
issues, we offer a factored approach to their analysis. The
following five factors will guide courts in establishing the
enforceability and fair disposition of morality clause cases. 276
Each factor, as well as the rubric’s structure, is influenced by
well-established legal tests in other comparable areas, such as
employment law, the law of non-competes, intellectual property
law, and psychology. Employment law informs the proper
balancing of employer and employee rights with regard to
employee off-duty behavior. The common law limitations on
restraints of trade provide a relevant logic and structure in
assessing morality clauses. 277 Finally, concepts borrowed from
trademark law and psychology instruct on the reasonableness of
associations between an individual and a business or product. 278
Like other legal factor tests, we propose that each factor is
assessed on a sliding scale. Although the preponderance of factors
can be determinative, a sliding scale approach allows for
275. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 33(2), 71, 174–77 (AM.
LAW INST. 1981) (identifying foundational principles of contracts).
276. See infra Part IV (outlining a five-factor test).
277. See infra Part IV.C (comparing to non-compete agreements).
278. See infra Part IV.B (relating brand association of trademarks to brand
associations with immoral behavior).
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increased reliance on a single factor at the discretion of the
courts.
The following framework submits that a valid morality
clause must be justified by a business interest and that there
must be a reasonable connection in the public’s minds between
the restricted party and the imposing party. 279 A strong public
association between the individual and the business can
legitimize a morality clause; a weak one should not. We propose a
practicable standard for its measure. Next the test considers the
scope and definiteness of the restriction, with the logic that
contracting parties should be aware of the behavior that will toll
the clause’s termination rights. 280 A third factor explores the
impact of the offending behavior to study whether a termination
is warranted and in good faith. 281 Finally, the rubric gauges the
burden on the contracting party. 282 A contract restricting legal
rights and speech should be carefully balanced against the
business’s rights and take into account the mutuality of the
obligation and the role and relative bargaining power of the
parties.
A. Nexus Between Misconduct and Business Interest
A basic tenet of agency law is that the nature of the business
and the position of the agent determine what conduct can be
expected from him. 283 It follows that a morality clause should be
reasonably tailored to protect a legitimate interest or mission of
the business. Of course, every business has a general interest in
maintaining a good reputation. While reasonable, this alone
should not be enough to restrict the legal behavior and speech of
279. For purposes of clarity, our framework will use the term “imposing
party” to refer to the party the morality clause is designed to protect, usually a
business. We will use the term “restricted party” to refer to the party whose
behavior is controlled by the clause, usually an individual. While these terms
are not commonplace in the law, their use will avoid confusion here.
280. See infra Part IV.C (considering the scope of definiteness requirement).
281. See infra Part IV.D (discussing impact of offending behavior).
282. See infra Part IV.E (considering burden upon restricted party).
283. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 380 cmt. a (AM. LAW INST.
1958) (“The nature of the business and the position of the agent
determine . . . what conduct can be expected from [the agent].”).
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its agents. Businesses seeking the enforceability of their morality
clauses should further justify the nexus between the misconduct
and their business interest or mission.
Our proposed nexus requirement is consistent with the
standards reflected in state wrongful discharge statutes and
federal government employment. 284 While these laws do not
involve private contracts and the federal rules do not govern the
private sector, their spirit, which is to prevent capricious and
pretextual acts, is instructive. 285
Some employment-at-will states have wrongful discharge
statutes to protect employees from being fired for legal, off-duty
conduct that is unrelated to their job. 286 Similarly, the federal
government prohibits removal from a civil service position where
private misconduct does not implicate “official responsibilities in
any direct and obvious way.” 287 A federal agency may remove an
employee “only for such cause as will promote the efficiency of the
service.” 288 Before removing an employee for off-duty misconduct,
an agency must make two determinations: (1) that the employee
actually committed the conduct; and (2) that removal will
promote the efficiency of the service. 289 The agency must show
284. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012) (“[A]n agency may take
action . . . against an employee only for such cause as will promote the efficiency
of the service.”); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2016) (requiring relation to a
bona fide occupational requirement).
285. See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012) (omitting private contracts); COLO.
REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (same).
286. By way of example, Colorado statute provides:
(1) It shall be a discriminatory or unfair employment practice
for an employer to terminate the employment of any employee
due to that employee’s engaging in any lawful activity off the
premises of the employer during nonworking hours unless such
a restriction: (a) Relates to a bona fide occupational
requirement or is reasonably and rationally related to the
employment activities and responsibilities of a particular
employee or a particular group of employees, rather than to all
employees of the employer; or (b) Is necessary to avoid a
conflict of interest with any responsibilities to the employer or
the appearance of such a conflict of interest.
COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-402.5 (2016).
287. Brown v. Dep’t of the Navy, 229 F.3d 1356, 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
288. 5 U.S.C. § 7513(a) (2012).
289. Sherman v. Alexander, 684 F.2d 464, 468 (7th Cir. 1982) (citing Young
v. Hampton, 568 F.2d 1253, 1257 (7th Cir. 1977)).
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that the off-duty conduct has some connection to the employee’s
or agency’s overall performance. 290 To determine whether such
nexus exists, courts and arbitrators focus on (1) harm to an
employer’s reputation or product, (2) the ability of an offending
employee to perform assigned duties or to appear at work, or
(3) the refusal or reluctance of other employees to work with the
person charged with off-duty misconduct. 291 Cases are the
hardest when a good, low-level employee does something off-duty
of which the employer disapproves.
Reported cases add flesh to these rules. Where there is little
connection between the agency’s mission or the job description
and the misconduct, courts generally reject discharges for
off-duty conduct. In one case, a NASA employee who was fired for
homosexual off-duty conduct was reinstated because the record
established no “ascertainable deleterious effect on the efficiency
of the service.” 292 In another, a court found that the Postal
Service’s dismissal of a letter carrier after his conviction of
possession of a small amount of illegal drugs in no way affected
his job. 293 Courts have even required a nexus in cases involving
grossly immoral conduct. In one case the Navy dismissed a
civilian diesel mechanic with strong on-the-job performance after
his conviction of child molestation. 294 The Navy contended that,
even though it had not been a source of notoriety or public shame,
the former employee’s behavior dampened the Navy’s “confidence
in his judgment” and cast doubts on his moral standards. 295 In
finding insufficient nexus, the Ninth Circuit concluded that
“[c]onclusory statements of distrust fall far short of the

290. See id. (“The nexus determination requires a showing of ‘that vital
connection between the employee’s complained of activities and some
identifiable detriment to the efficiency of the service . . . .”).
291. Carlton J. Snow, The Long Arm of the Boss: Employee Off-Duty Conduct
and the Reputation of the Employer, 15 LERC MONOGRAPH SER. 9, 12 (1998)
[hereinafter Snow, The Long Arm of the Boss] (citing W.E. Caldwell Co., 28 Lab.
Arb. 434 (1957)).
292. Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161, 1165 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
293. See Grebosz v. U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n, 472 F. Supp. 1081, 1089
(S.D.N.Y. 1979) (“[The employer] has failed to offer any evidence whatsoever
that its discharge of [employee] will promote the efficiency of the service.”).
294. D.E. v. Dep’t of the Navy, MSPB, 721 F.2d 1165, 1165 (9th Cir. 1983).
295. Id. at 1169.
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substantial evidence required to remove” the employee. 296 A Fifth
Circuit case with similar facts reached the same conclusion: A
postal worker charged with indecency with a child kept his job
because it did not involve interaction with children and the
agency could not prove more than the generalized
reprehensibility of the conduct. 297
Courts reach a different conclusion in cases in which the
offending conduct undermines the mission of the agency. The
Federal Circuit found that the Marine Corps was justified in
firing a recreational manager for having an affair with a
serviceman’s wife. 298 Since the manager’s job involved supporting
military personnel and their families, his off-duty misconduct,
although personal, affected the very mission of his division and
lessened the confidence that departing military spouses might
have in the program. 299 The Seventh Circuit determined that the
Department of Housing and Urban Development (“HUD”) could
legitimately fire an otherwise effective employee who was a
known slumlord. 300 In a commonsensical evaluation arguing that
behavior inconsistent with mission justifies termination, Judge
Posner stated as follows:
If an employee of a manufacturer of safes moonlighted as a
safe cracker, his days as an employee of that manufacturer
would be numbered, even if he scrupulously avoided cracking
safes manufactured by his employer. If an officer of a
musicians’ union owned a nightclub that employed non-union
musicians, because their wages were lower, his days as an
employee of the union would be numbered. A customs officer
caught smuggling, an immigration officer caught employing
illegal aliens, an IRS employee who files false income tax
returns, a HUD appraiser moonlighting as a “slumlord”—these
are merely the public counterparts of a form of conflict of
interest that is not less serious for not being financial, that
would not be tolerated in the private sector, and that we do not
believe Congress meant to sanctify in the public sector. 301
296.
297.
298.
299.
300.
1982).
301.

Id.
Bonet v. U.S. Postal Serv., 661 F.2d 1071, 1079 (5th Cir. 1981).
Brown v. Dep’t of the Navy, 229 F.3d 1356, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2000).
Id. at 1363.
Wild v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 692 F.2d 1129, 1134 (7th Cir.
Id. at 1133.
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Measuring the nexus between the nature of the misconduct
and the business interest or mission is easiest when the interest
or mission is definite. A law firm has a business interest in
ensuring that its lawyers do not embezzle client funds or cheat
the government. However, it has less of a business interest in
meddling into the extramarital affairs of its lawyers because
absent an office scandal, the nexus is significantly attenuated.
B. Degree of Meaning Transfer: What is the Likelihood of
Association?
Not every agent has the same degree of representative
power. In assessing the fairness and enforceability of a morality
clause, courts should examine the degree that the agent is or can
be associated with the business in the minds of the public. We
referenced this theory above as “meaning transfer,” 302 or the
attachment and flow of cultural meanings from one person to a
product or organization. 303 An individual with little or no public
association with a business is unlikely to have the power to
publicly shame it. In this case, restrictions on off-duty conduct
are less justifiable.
We can measure the degree of association by borrowing a
tenet of trademark law. Like morality clauses, trademark law
looks to protect a business’s established goodwill and reputation
from those who may tarnish it. 304 Trademark law assesses
infringement by asking “what is the likelihood of consumer
confusion?” 305 Here, we may determine the legitimacy of the
morality clause by asking “what is the likelihood of consumer
association?” That is, would the consuming public associate the
individual and his off-duty antics with the business? A high
likelihood of consumer association is direct evidence of a
protectable business interest in reputation and also indicative of

302. McCracken, Culture and Consumption, supra note 38, at 71–84.
303. See supra Part II.B (discussing meaning transfer).
304. See Eric A. Prager, The Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995:
Substantial Likelihood of Confusion, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT.
L.J. 121, 124 (1996) (discussing the purpose of trademark protections).
305. See id. at 122–23 (discussing consumer confusion and trademark law).
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the potential negative impact of the misconduct. We elucidate
with categorization and examples.
In a class by themselves are professions with inherent
morality requirements, which the public recognizes. Individuals
charged with the care of children, money, and the public trust
have a heightened morality requirement implicit in their
professional duties; they are caretakers and must demonstrate
good sense and judgment. 306 Journalists must maintain the
appearance of neutrality. 307 Lawyers, judges, and police officers
must respect the law. Religious leaders must practice what they
preach. 308 Simply put, the misdeeds of those in certain
professions are subject to higher public scrutiny because of their
inherent symbolism, whether or not they are public figures.
Judges represent the law as preachers represent the church. A
rupture in any of these social performances diminishes the
effectiveness of the individual and casts a negative light on both
the associated establishment and the general institution. 309
Endorsement or sponsorship relationships are another
category of a heightened consumer association, as their very
purpose is to create a positive meaning transfer. Athletes, artists,
and other celebrities entering into these agreements are
sophisticated contracting parties with high degrees of bargaining
power and representation. 310 It is worth noting that endorsement
relationships can also be found in company to company
agreements. For instance, before the 2002 Winter Olympic
Games, several corporate sponsors of the global event voiced
306. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(requiring competent representation by attorneys); AICPA Code of Professional
Conduct, AICPA, http://www.aicpa.org/Research/Standards/CodeofConduct/
Pages/default.aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (describing professional standards
for accountants) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
307. See SPJ Code of Ethics, SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL JOURNALISTS,
https://www.spj.org/pdf/ethicscode.pdf (promoting fair and honest reporting
practices).
308. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 8.3 (AM. BAR ASS’N 1983)
(requiring attorneys to not engage in criminal activity).
309. See Donald Nicolson, Mapping Professional Legal Ethics: The Form and
Focus of the Codes, 1 LEGAL ETHICS 51, 52–53 (1998) (discussing the role and
motivations for adopting professional codes).
310. See Robert S. Adler & Elliot M. Silverstein, When David Meets Goliath:
Dealing with Power Differentials in Negotiations, 5 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 23
(2000) (identifying celebrity status as a form of power in negotiation).
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concerns regarding a prior bribery scandal. 311 As a result, those
sponsors and the International Olympic Committee included
morality clauses in each of their agreements. 312
Other relationships carrying associative power are less clear,
perhaps because their representative role is secondary to other
duties. A CEO, for example, runs a company but also often serves
as its public face. 313 A particularly charismatic or famous
executive (like Martha Stewart, Lee Iacocca, or the late Steve
Jobs) becomes synonymous with her or his company. An on-air
personality’s primary role is to entertain or report, but he can
also be said to represent his employer. Recall the case of baseball
analyst Curt Schilling, who was fired from ESPN for sharing an
offensive photo about transgender people on Facebook. 314
Similarly, board members and major donors, when public, have
the potential of high meaning transfer. Cases abound in which
donations have been returned or naming rights revoked in fear of
a negative association. 315
Finally, there is the lowest level of meaning transfer: the
low-profile agent. Businesses may legitimately have an interest
in ensuring the decent, lawful behavior of all of their employees
to ensure a good culture or to avoid negative press. However,
when the behavior restriction constrains the legal off-duty
conduct of agents with low meaning transfer, it may not be
justifiable because there is a negligible foreseeable impact on the
311. See Pinguelo & Cedrone, Morals? Who Cares About Morals?, supra note
3, at 366 (discussing bribery concerns).
312. See id. at 366 (discussing inclusion of morality clauses).
313. See Z. Jill Barclift, Corporate Governance and CEO Dominance, 50
WASHBURN L.J. 611, 612 (2011) (discussing charismatic and dominant CEO
figures).
314. Sanomir, Curt Schilling, supra note 122 and accompanying text.
315. Seton Hall University named buildings and funds after Dennis
Kozlowski, former CEO of Tyco International. In 2005, Kozlowski was convicted
of grand larceny, conspiracy, securities fraud, and falsifying business records.
Kozlowski voluntarily accepted the removal of his name, suggesting the
presence of a morality clause. Similarly, prior to the Enron scandal, the
University of Missouri named an economics chair position after Enron Executive
Kenneth Lay in exchange for a large donation of Enron stock. The University
subsequently removed his name from the position. See Adam Scott Goldberg,
When Charitable Gift Agreements Go Bad: Why a Morals Clause Should Be
Contained in Every Charitable Gift Agreement, 89 FLA. BAR J. 48, 49 (2015)
(discussing the return of charitable gifts).
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business’s reputation. In other words, if the public does not
associate a disgraced individual with his company, his bad
behavior or its fallout should not be grounds for dismissal. This is
necessarily a fact- and context-specific analysis because
depending on the circumstances, agents at all levels can have
representative power. Consider the fast food worker who appears
in a shocking YouTube video in company uniform, or the delivery
driver identified as a company employee in news reports detailing
his drug arrest. 316
C. The Scope and Definiteness of the Restrictive Clause
Next, an enforceable morality clause should be sufficiently
narrow and definite so as to allow a party to predict with
reasonable certainty what conduct will trigger the clause. As
discussed above, to be enforceable, a contract must be reasonably
definite in its terms. 317 Beyond this relatively low standard, when
a particularly restrictive clause is involved, there is a general
interest in ensuring that parties have the ability to actually
understand what it is they are agreeing to. For example, courts
generally require that exculpatory clauses meet a higher level of
clarity to be enforceable. 318 Likewise, in inspecting a morality
clause, a party should be able to reasonably predict what conduct
would violate the agreement.
A problem arises, however, when the majority of morality
clauses are drafted very broadly and give the imposing party the
power to interpret the clause. Recall the Los Angeles County
morality clause, which prohibits any behavior that would “be an
embarrassment to the County.” 319 The handbook gives no
316. Snow, The Long Arm of the Boss, supra note 291, at 13–14 (citing Delta
Beverage Group, Inc. and General Truck Drivers, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers, Teamsters Local 270, 96 LA 454 (1991)).
317. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 33(2) (AM. LAW INST. 1981)
(requiring a contract to have reasonably definite terms).
318. See Mark Seiberling, “Icing” on the Cake: Allowing Amateur Athletic
Promoters to Escape Liability In Mohney v. USA Hockey, Inc., 9 VILL. SPORTS &
ENT. L.J. 417, 429 (2002) (explaining the high level of scrutiny placed on
exculpatory clauses by courts).
319. CTY. OF LOS ANGELES, EMPLOYEE HANDBOOK 16 (2003),
http://file.lacounty.gov/lac/cms1_113484.pdf.
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direction as to what type of behavior would embarrass the county.
Would commissioners be embarrassed by an employee’s
solicitation of a prostitute? What about an employee’s gender
reassignment surgery? Would an employee’s extramarital affair
be an embarrassment? Clauses of such breadth make this
determination very difficult, if not impossible.
Further, while public morals are already quickly changing
and difficult to follow, the morals of an individual company or
supervisor could be even more fleeting. This requires the
restricted party to determine at any given time who at the
company would make the decision to terminate and whether that
particular person would be offended by some certain action. By
contrast, a morality clause that is interpreted under a community
or reasonable person standard would be more concrete and
predictable.
With regard to covenants not to compete, the majority of
states have found that to be enforceable, the clause must be
“narrowly tailored” to protect a legitimate business interest. 320
Similarly, businesses should be required to draft morality clauses
in sufficiently definite terms so as to allow the restricted party to
predict violating behavior with relative ease.
1. Legal Behavior
Courts should analyze morality clauses that prohibit legal
behavior with higher scrutiny than those that are triggered only
by unlawful activity. Simply put, there is minimal public interest
in preventing parties from discouraging illegal conduct. Note that
as a basic tenant of contract law, a restricted party’s promise not
to engage in illegal behavior cannot even constitute valid
consideration, as he is not giving up any existing rights. 321
On the other hand, most employees and contracting parties
would likely agree that while they are off the clock, their
320. See Norman D. Bishara, Fifty Ways to Leave Your Employer: Relative
Enforcement of Covenants Not to Compete, Trends, and Implications for
Employee Mobility Policy, 13 U. PA. J. BUS. L. 751, 780 (2011) (discussing the
level of specificity required of morality clauses).
321. See Patterson, supra note 269, at 938 (discussing clauses concerning
illegal behavior).
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employer’s control over their legal conduct should be greatly
limited, if not nonexistent. It is under this rationale that four
states have made it unlawful for an employer to terminate an
employee based on legal, off-duty conduct. 322 For instance, a
California statute broadly prohibits adverse employment action
“for lawful conduct occurring during nonworking hours away
from the employer’s premises.” 323 In enacting the law, the
California legislature recognized the public policy of “protecting
the [civil] rights of individual employees . . . who could not
otherwise afford to protect themselves.” 324
Overall, there is considerable worth in upholding the division
between the home and the workplace, as employees should
generally be free from their employers’ restrictions outside of
working hours. However, where a morality clause merely
prohibits illegal behavior, the policy supporting this division is
much more limited.
2. Prohibiting Speech
As to morality clauses prohibiting speech, courts should
apply a heightened scrutiny. In a difficult economy, the need for
gainful employment can make an employee quite willing to give
up certain rights. But when a person seeks to surrender a right
as paramount as the freedom of speech, public policy supports
giving the agreement a closer look.
It is of course true that while the First Amendment protects
the free-speech rights of government employees, no such
protection exists as to private employees and contractors. 325 This
322. See McNelis, supra note 249, at 238 (discussing state limitation on
adverse action based on off-duty conduct).
323. CAL. LAB. CODE § 96(k) (West 2016); see also N.Y. LAB. LAW § 201–d
(McKinney 2016) (making it illegal for an employer to terminate an employee
based on off-duty political and recreational activities).
324. Marisa Anne Pagnattaro, What Do You Do When You Are Not at Work?:
Limiting the Use of Off-Duty Conduct As the Basis for Adverse Employment
Decisions, 6 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 625, 647 (2004) (quoting CAL. LAB. CODE
§ 98.6 note (West 2003) (historical and statutory notes)).
325. See David C. Yamada, Voices from the Cubicle: Protecting and
Encouraging Private Employee Speech in the Post-Industrial Workplace, 19
BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 1, 20 (1998) (noting the lack of free speech
protections in private workplaces).
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would likely come as a surprise to a great percentage of American
workers who believe their freedom of expression is more
inclusive. 326 Some legal scholars have gone so far as to argue that
First Amendment protections should be extended to employees of
corporations. 327
The policy supporting free speech is especially strong when
the speech is political or religious in nature. Regardless of its lack
of private protection, the First Amendment still gives valuable
insight into the public policy surrounding free speech, 328 and as
stated by former Supreme Court Justice Sandra Day O’Connor,
“political speech [is] at the core of what the First Amendment is
designed to protect.” 329 Accordingly, some states already explicitly
recognize this public policy in protecting a private employee’s free
speech rights. 330
It is important to reiterate here that this Article does not
argue that the mere fact that a morality clause restricts speech
makes that clause invalid. Again, like all factors under this
proposed test, the scope of the clause is part of a sliding scale.
Still, a broad clause that prohibits significant legal activity and
speech, particularly political speech, should slide ever closer
towards unenforceability.

326. See Aaron Kirkland, Note, “You Got Fired? On Your Day Off?!”:
Challenging Termination of Employees for Personal Blogging Practices, 75
UMKC L. REV. 545, 550 n.45 (2006) (citing Pauline T. Kim, Bargaining with
Imperfect Information: A Study of Worker Perceptions of Legal Protection in an
At-Will World, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 105, 133 (1997) (reporting that employees
surveyed “reveal[ed] a striking level of misunderstanding among respondents of
the most basic legal rules governing the [at-will] employment relationship”)).
327. See, e.g., Adam S. Mintz, Note, Do Corporate Rights Trump Individual
Rights? Preserving an Individual Rights Model in a Pluralist Society, 44 COLUM.
J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 267, 309 (2011) [hereinafter Mintz, Note, Do Corporate Rights
Trump Individual Rights] (discussing free speech rights in the private sector).
328. See Novosel v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 721 F.2d 894, 898–99 (1983)
(holding that concern for rights of political expression under the First
Amendment is sufficient to state public policy applicable to private employers
under Pennsylvania law).
329. Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 365 (2003).
330. Mintz, Note, Do Corporate Rights Trump Individual Rights, supra note
Error! Bookmark not defined., at 273–74.
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D. Impact of Offending Behavior

Whether it is worded as a Bad Behavior or a Reputational
Impact clause, fairly enforcing a morality clause should require a
showing that the offending behavior (a) actually occurred, (b) is
known or likely to be known, and (c) is likely to cause damage to
the imposing party. 331 We address each assessment in turn.
1. Actual Occurrence
A grave injustice would ensue if the law allowed for the
termination of an agent who was merely the victim of defamation.
However, a rumor can cause reputational damage whether true
or false—and companies can be quick to the trigger to distance
themselves from possible scandal. 332 In the event that credible
evidence contradicts allegations of misbehavior, the enforcement
of a morality clause is weakened. After all, most morality clauses
are premised on the actual happening of the offending event and
even in circumstances where a falsity might injure an employer’s
reputation, it should be assumed that publication of the truth will
repair any damage.
2. Known or Likely to be Known
If a tree falls in the forest and no one is around to hear it,
does it make a sound? If a consultant tries cocaine and only his
boss knows it, does it affect the business enough to justify
termination? The answer to the second question depends in part
on the publicity—or the publicity potential—of the information.
In today’s world, this is relatively easy element to prove, as
anything posted online for more than one person to see would
certainly meet the publicity requirement. Like established
principles in defamation law, broad dissemination should not be
331. See Infra Part IV.D (discussing different impacts of immoral employee
behavior).
332. See Robert D. Highfill, The Effects of News of Crime and Scandal upon
Public Opinion, 17 CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 40, 40–41 (1926) (discussing the
impact of scandal on public opinion).
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required. 333 Even knowledge spreading to one client can affect a
business. Private misbehavior should be beyond the reach of
meddling employers, but the more the information spreads, the
more likely that it will have a noxious impact on the employer.
3. Likely to Cause Damage to the Imposing Party
A general morality clause should only be enforceable if the
imposing party can prove that the offending behavior caused
harm or that reputational harm is reasonably foreseeable given
the facts. This is consistent with principles of employment law
and with the spirit of most morality clauses.
It is often difficult for imposing parties to prove the negative
impact of publicity. In some cases, the terminating party can offer
evidence of customer complaints, adverse media coverage, a
chorus of backlash on social media, or even a decrease in sales or
a boycott. Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, discussed above, involved
this quantum of proof. 334 When the company’s endorser—a wellknown athlete—posted politically unpopular social media
comments, Hanesbrands fired him immediately under a
Reputational Impact clause giving it the right to terminate for a
public scandal. 335 The athlete’s arguments defeated the motion
for judgment on the pleadings because, while there was evidence
that the post offended some, there was also evidence that others
supported his thinking. 336 With this in mind, the court held that
it was necessary for the company to prove the existence of a
verifiable public scandal in order to defeat a claim of breach of
good faith and fair dealing. 337
Given the realities of modern business and communications,
requiring the showing of an actual adverse impact is too difficult
a burden. Direct proof of adverse reaction or reputational harm is
333. See DAN B. DOBBS, PAUL T. HAYDEN & ELLEN M. BUBLICK, THE LAW OF
TORTS § 519 (2d ed. June 2016 Update) (discussing the elements of a defamation
claim).
334. See 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 720 (2012) (discussing reputational harms
from social media postings).
335. Id. at 720.
336. Id. at 727–28.
337. Id.
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always difficult to prove. In fact, most employment arbitrators
generally reject such a requirement in the federal employment
context. 338 Firms should not have to wait for negative
consequences before firing an agent who is a ticking time bomb.
But how far should a court go in inferring reputational damage?
Weighing the likelihood of disclosure, courts should assess
the potential for future adverse impact by asking: If the public
discovered the information, would the imposing party’s
reputation be negatively affected? This analysis hinges on the
particular facts of the case and reasonably-based public
perception.
E. Burden on the Restricted Party
Finally, in analyzing a morality clause, courts should
consider the burden the clause places upon the restricted party,
balancing it against the interests of the imposing party. As
discussed in detail with regard to scope and definiteness, 339
morality clauses often significantly restrain an employee’s or
associate’s freedom of expression and freedom to engage in other
legal activity outside of the workplace. Further, they can blur the
already fading line between work and home life, when employees
are constantly under the scrutiny of their employers.
1. Parties’ Relative Bargaining Power
An additional concern for restricted parties is their relative
lack of bargaining power when considering agreements
containing morality clauses, particularly in the employment
context. 340 While an employee could theoretically negotiate the
terms of her employment to limit or eliminate the clause, in
reality, most prospective employees lack such power. 341 As of
338. Snow, The Long Arm of the Boss, supra note 291, at 14.
339. See supra Part IV.C (discussing scope and definiteness).
340. See Daniel D. Barnhizer, Inequality of Bargaining Power, 76 U. COLO.
L. REV. 139, 143 (2005) (arguing that courts look to limited circumstances in
regards to bargaining power, often failing to consider certain asymmetries like a
constructive lack of choice rather than actual lack of choice).
341. Id.
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early 2017, the U–6 rate (economists’ preferred measure for
unemployment in the United States) remained at around 9.4%. 342
In most cases today, employment is a buyer’s market. While
estimates vary, sources have reported that somewhere between
59 and 250 potential employees apply for the average job
opening. 343
Most people who have looked for work in recent years can
attest that the process is lengthy. 344 One must search for position
openings, draft cover letters, submit applications, attend
interviews, wait for the completion of background checks,
complete human resources documentation, etc. When considering
the process and the above-cited employment statistics, it is not
surprising that only around 10% of those offered jobs turn them
down. 345 For most, it seems unlikely that after finally obtaining a
sought-after position, the candidate would contest a contractual
provision requiring him to exercise good behavior or avoid
causing embarrassment. Most peoples’ optimism bias would
certainly convince them to believe they are not likely to behave
badly—or suffer the ill-effects of a harshly-enforced morality
clause.
As a general contract principle, such limited bargaining
power can at times lead to the invalidation of agreements. 346
When
invalidating
agreements
on
the
grounds
of
342. Nicholas Wells, Unemployment Rose Slightly in January, but a More
Realistic Rate is Even Higher, CNBC (Feb. 3, 2017, 9:16 AM),
http://www.cnbc.com/2017/02/03/jobs-unemployment-rose-slightly-but-more-realisticrate-is-higher.html (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (on file with the Washington and
Lee Law Review).
343. See How to Increase Your Odds of Getting an Interview, U. MICH.
CAREER CENTER, https://careercenter.umich.edu/article/how-increase-your-oddsgetting-interview (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (“Some say 118 applicants per job
opening and others say up to 250.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review); Martha C. White, Here’s How Long It Really Takes to Get a Job, TIME
MAG. (Oct. 22, 2015), http://time.com/money/4053899/how-long-it-takes-to-gethired/ (last visited Mar. 4, 2017) (illustrating that on average fifty-nine people
will apply for an open position, while only twelve perent will receive an
interview) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
344. See White, supra note 343 (determining that the average job search
process takes just over six weeks).
345. See id. (“[R]oughly one in 10 people who are offered a job turn it
down.”).
346. See Lonegrass, supra note 157, at 5 (discussing the unconscionability of
standardized forms between large corporations and consumers).
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unconscionability, courts look to whether the contract was
procedurally unconscionable, “indicating that the transaction
lacked meaningful choice on the part of the complaining party.” 347
In terms of morality clauses, this highlights the important
distinction between a high-profile party to an endorsement
agreement (who has significant bargaining power) and the
average employee (who has very little). 348
2. Employee’s Reputation
While the purpose of a morality clause is to protect the image
of the imposing party, it is also necessary to consider the
reputation and future opportunities of the restricted party. While
it is certainly true that any harm to the employee’s reputation is
the result of events she herself set in motion, in some situations,
the employee should be entitled to repose.
However, a morality clause may cause an ill-advised action
or statement to follow an employee much longer than it would
absent the clause. 349 An employee who is terminated from a
long-term position pursuant to a morality clause based on some
insensitive off-duty statement will likely be required to disclose
this statement to his next potential employer, thereby harming
his chances of future employment. 350
In some jurisdictions, the law of defamation recognizes this
concern in the employment context. In order to establish a claim
for defamation, a plaintiff must show that the defendant made a
statement tending to harm the plaintiff’s reputation. 351 The
plaintiff must also show that the defendant somehow “published”
347. Id. at 9.
348. See id. at 5 (emphasizing that form contracts may be inherently unfair
because consumers are “virtually powerless to find better terms elsewhere in the
market”).
349. See infra note 359 and accompanying text (discussing that actions
taken by employees, when made on social media, may follow the employee after
termination).
350. See infra note 359 (citing sources examining how insensitive
statements made on social media may harm an employee’s future prospects).
351. See James B. Lake, Restraining False Light: Constitutional and
Common Law Limits on a “Troublesome Tort”, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 625, 628
(2009) (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (AM. LAW INST. 1938)).
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the statement or made it available to the public. 352 Over the past
few decades, however, courts have begun to recognize the
doctrine of compelled self-publication. 353 That is, a
plaintiff/employee can establish the publication element if it is
foreseeable that he himself would have to repeat the defamatory
remarks when applying for future positions. 354
For instance, in Brown v. M. Caratan, Inc., 355 an employer
terminated an employee, claiming she had lied on application
documents. 356 In deciding that “it was foreseeable that [the
employee] would be compelled in future interviews to explain her
former employer’s proffered justification for firing her,” the
Eastern District of California held that the employee had
presented sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment on
her self-defamation claim. 357
The doctrine of self-publication thus recognizes that
employees will likely be required to divulge details of a
termination to future potential employers. 358 With regard to
morality clauses, in the modern economy where businesses of all
kinds are highly protective of their images, disclosure of a
termination for some past unwise statement could significantly
impact one’s employment prospects, even if that statement was
relatively minor and made years earlier. 359 In sum, there are
352. Id. at 627.
353. See
Laureen
K.
Kuzur,
Torts—Defamation—Compelled
Self-Publication, Sullivan v. Baptist Memorial Hospital, 995 S.W.2d 569 (Tenn.
1999), 68 TENN. L. REV. 395, 395–96 (2001) (directing that a minority of courts
have adopted the doctrine of compelled self-publication).
354. Id.
355. 142 F. Supp. 3d 1007 (E.D. Cal. 2015).
356. Id. at 1032–34.
357. Id. at 1035.
358. See id. at 1035 (noting that an employee who had previously been fired
would have to self-publish a company’s defamatory statements in order to
explain in interviews to potential employers the reason the employee had been
terminated).
359. Particularly when considering the permanent nature of social media
and the internet, it could be unduly burdensome on an employee to hold him
accountable for statements made years earlier. The harm to the employer would
likely be reduced based on the now minimal relevance of the statement. See
Mendenhall v. Hanesbrands, Inc., 856 F. Supp. 2d 717, 726 (M.D.N.C. 2012)
(denying Hanesbrands’ motion to dismiss Mendenhall’s claim that Hanesbrands
impermissibly terminated Mendenhall pursuant to a morality clause in
response to Mendenhall’s controversial tweets). The case was subsequently
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certain situations where the potential harm to an employee
greatly outweighs the likely harm to her employer. 360
F. Application of the Model Test
An exercise in applying the factors is instructive in proving
their logic and practicability. What follows are five illustrations
based loosely on documented case law, media reports, and
existing morality clauses. An analysis based on the five factors
supplements.
ILLUSTRATION 1 361
A marketing firm for lawyers hires a famous actor as its
spokesperson. The morality clause provides that the firm can
terminate the relationship if the endorser does anything to
embarrass it. Later, the firm learns that the actor appeared on
the internet in a comedy skit making fun of plaintiffs’ attorneys.
A quick internet search uncovers that he has recently engaged in
a bar fight.

settled without discussion, on the merits, of the relationship between morality
clauses and the use of social media. See Marc Edelman, Rashard Mendenhall
Settles Lawsuit with Hanesbrands over Morals Clause, FORBES (Jan. 17, 2013),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/marcedelman/2013/01/17/rashard-mendenhall-settleslawsuit-with-hanesbrands-over-morals-clause/#5a322b076c87 (last visited Mar. 4,
2017) (“Just three days later, L. Lynette Fuller-Andrews, the acting general
counsel for Hanesbrands, informed Mendenhall that Hanesbrands was
terminating his endorsement contract. As grounds for termination, FullerAndrews referenced the morals clause in Mendenhall’s contract . . . .”) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review); see also Jacquelyn Smith, How
Social Media Can Help (or Hurt) Your Job Search, FORBES (Apr. 16, 2013, 4:20
PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/jacquelynsmith/2013/04/16/how-social-mediacan-help-or-hurt-your-job-search/#cf8eb8e24fdb (last visited Mar. 4, 2017)
(detailing that about fifty percent of companies look to social media to determine
whether a candidate is a good fit for the company) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
360. See supra notes 355–357 and accompanying text (citing sources to
suggest the potential harm to employees for being fired pursuant to morality
contracts because employees may be forced to disclose to new employers the
reason for termination).
361. This illustration is loosely based on the facts of Bernsen v. Innovative
Legal Marketing, LLC, 885 F. Supp. 2d 830 (E.D. Va. 2012).
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• Nexus: The actor’s participation in the skit has a strong
nexus to his role as a proponent of legal services. That negative
association undermines the purpose of the contract. The nexus is
significantly more tenuous as it relates to the bar fight.
• Meaning Transfer: The primary purpose of an
endorsement agreement is to achieve meaning transfer, thus
meeting this factor.
• Scope of Clause: The wide breadth of the clause prohibits
legal speech and expression; however, this may be justified in
light of the party’s bargaining power and purpose of the
endorsement agreement.
• Impact: The offending acts are known because they were
posted on the internet. The well-known actor is likely to garner
attention on the internet due to his fame. Humiliating lawyers is
reasonably going to embarrass legal marketers.
• Burden: This endorsement agreement is not the actor’s
primary employment and he enjoys a high degree of bargaining
power.
• RESULT: The factors weigh heavily in favor of the
enforceability of the clause.
ILLUSTRATION 2 362
The employment contract between a college football coach
and a major university provides that he will not engage in
conduct “that brings the University into disrepute; or that reflects
dishonesty, disloyalty, willful misconduct, gross negligence, moral
turpitude or refusal or unwillingness to perform his duties.” The
police arrest the coach for domestic battery. ESPN’s cameras
record the moment the coach was booked, and the network
broadcasts these images nationally.
• Nexus: While highly reprehensible, the football coach’s
private domestic dispute has little to do with his primary role as
a coach, which is to train his athletes and lead his team to
success.
362. The illustration is loosely based on the facts of Haywood v. University of
Pittsburgh, 976 F. Supp. 2d 606 (W.D. Pa. 2013).
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• Meaning Transfer: Though secondary to his athletic
responsibilities, as the head of a football program at a major
university, the coach is high-profile figurehead and a leader and
role model to players and fans alike. His private actions do
represent his institution.
• Scope of Clause: As enforced here, the morality clause
attempts to terminate the employee over allegations of illegal
behavior, actions that deserve the lowest protection.
• Impact: As the subject of indisputable national media
coverage, the coach’s actions will certainly impact the university,
which will presumably receive strong pressure to distance itself
from one of its most high-profile (and highly paid) employees. If it
does not, the school could be perceived as condoning the actions
and become the subject of further negative attention or even
boycotts.
• Burden: The coach’s high-level success in sports likely
granted him significant bargaining power when signing the
agreement with the university. Further, any negative impact on
his reputation would be the result of the domestic battery itself,
rather than from the termination of his contract.
• RESULT: The factors weigh heavily in favor of the
enforceability of the clause.
ILLUSTRATION 3 363
A small private university hires a married man as an
assistant director of financial aid. The employment contract
includes a clause stating, “as a Christian institution, the
university requires all administrators to exercise strong family
values.” During the term of the contract, the director’s wife files
for divorce after she discovers he has had multiple recent affairs.
The director’s home life becomes the subject of gossip among
school employees and students, and the university terminates his
employment pursuant to the clause.
• Nexus: The administrator’s private life does not have a
nexus to his daily professional responsibilities, nor is he a role
363. The illustration is based loosely on the Lee University morality clause.
Supra note 212.
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model or figurehead. However, the institution’s clear mission is
articulated and clear and it is reasonable for it to require its
employees to exercise and model it, even in their private lives, if
they freely agree to it in advance.
• Meaning Transfer: As the subject is a relatively low-profile
employee, meaning transfer is likely to be limited. Still, the fact
that employees and students became privy to the information
could create the impression on-campus that the small university
does not in fact uphold Christian family values.
• Scope of Clause: The clause in this case is broad but clear:
it requires the exercise of “strong family values,” and cites
Christianity as the framework for determining such values. The
employee could have quite easily predicted that adultery would
be a violation of the clause.
• Impact: Although major economic consequences seem
unlikely, with regard to those who know the on-campus gossip,
the director’s conduct may undermine the mission of the school.
This climate could affect employee culture and student morale.
• Burden: In this case, the low-profile employee likely had
minimal power to negotiate the terms of the agreement. On the
other hand, an employee’s past infidelity is not likely the type of
behavior that would prevent him from obtaining future
employment, at least at secular universities and businesses.
• RESULT: Due largely to the morality clause’s clarity and
ease of predictability, the factors weigh in favor of enforceability.
ILLUSTRATION 4 364
An employment agreement between ABC insurance company
and a claims adjuster includes the following provision: “Team
Members should avoid off-duty behavior that would have a
negative impact on their job performance at the Company,
conflict with their obligations to the Company, or in any way
negatively affect the Company’s reputation.” ABC discovers that
the claims adjuster, an employee of five years, recently created
364. The illustration is loosely based on a combination of (1) a morality
clause found in TYSON FOODS, INC., CODE OF CONDUCT (2016),
http://media.corporate-ir.net/media_files/irol/65/65476/govDocs/codeofconduct.pdf;
and (2) ESPN’s termination of Curt Schilling. Sanomir, Curt Schilling, supra
note 122.
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and posted a racially-insensitive meme on his personal (but not
private) Facebook page that poked fun at Asian-American
drivers. The meme, which went viral, received significant
negative online feedback.
• Nexus: The employee’s behavior, although potentially
offensive, has a weak nexus to his role as an insurance adjuster.
The company’s best argument (and one that is often attempted) is
that the act shows overall poor judgment and that this, by
extension, can affect his professional performance. This is a
tenuous proposition.
• Meaning Transfer: Although the claims adjuster acts as
the face of the company with individual clients, the general public
is unlikely to transfer his bad behavior onto his employer.
• Scope of Clause: The wide breadth of the clause effectively
pokes a hole in the contract, allowing unilateral termination and
overuse over something relatively minor.
• Impact: The offending acts are known because they
garnered significant online attention. However, nothing in the
post suggests an association with the employer, so it is unlikely
that it will have a negative effect on its reputation. Given the
ease of posting feedback online, the fact that the comment got
much online feedback does not mean that it created a scandal.
• Burden: Like most rank-and-file employees who sign form
employment contracts, the employee had little bargaining power
over this ambiguous clause. A termination would have a negative
impact on the employee of five years, who almost certainly would
have to disclose the cause for termination to future employers.
• RESULT: The factors weigh against the application of the
clause to terminate the employee.
ILLUSTRATION 5 365
A freelance cellphone application developer enters into an
independent contractor agreement to create an educational app
for a children’s television show. The contract includes a clause
that generally prohibits the developer’s “moral turpitude.” During
365. This illustration is loosely based on the facts of Jarry v. Southington
Bd. of Educ., No. 3:08CV954(WWE), 2009 WL 179817, at *1 (D. Conn. Jan. 22,
2009).
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the engagement, the app developer competes in a bikini contest
broadcast nationally on raunchy late night television show. On
the show, she mentions that she creates children’s apps, but does
not mention for whom.
• Nexus: At first blush, appearing scantily-clad on television
has little to do with developing software. The company may argue
that because she was engaged to develop content relating to
children’s education, a nexus is present.
• Meaning Transfer: This relationship has a very low degree
of meaning transfer. App developers work behind the scenes and
are not generally known to the public. She is not a fulltime
employee. These factors militate against a finding of meaning
transfer.
• Scope of Clause: A party should be able to reasonably
predict what conduct would violate the agreement. This a
temporary engagement and the clause does not state or reference
the mission of the company with regard to children. Moreover,
while not necessarily professional or prudent, the app developer’s
conduct was neither illegal nor ignominious.
• Impact: Even though this segment was broadcast
nationally, the general public is not likely to associate the
subject’s identity with the company’s, and therefore there will
likely be little to no impact.
• Burden: The freelance developer has relatively little
bargaining power, but it must be noted that any burden on her
future reputation may have been caused by her own appearance
on the show.
• RESULT: The factors weigh against the application of the
clause to terminate the app developer.
By taking into account the role of the employee, the
predictability and breadth of the clause, and its foreseeable
impact on the company and burden on the individual, morality
clauses can be tailored to attend to the legitimate business
interests of the imposing party while at the same time respecting
the liberty and privacy of the individual.
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V. Conclusion

In a pre-internet case examining the fairness of a
non-contractual termination for off-duty conduct, Judge Posner
commented that, “where an employee’s off-duty behavior is
blatantly inconsistent with the mission of the employer and is
known or likely to become known, most any employer, public or
private, however broadminded, would want to fire the employee
and would be reasonable in wanting to do so.” 366 While, in certain
circumstances, imposing parties should be able to employ and
enforce morality clauses, the law must have a balanced standard
for analyzing their enforceability. 367 The unfettered use of
morality clauses can be socially harmful and unjust. 368
Remaining unchecked, these restrictions can be loopholes for
terminations in bad faith, pretexts for discrimination, and vague,
unilateral limitations enforced at the imposing party’s whim and
subject to the ever-changing social and political tides. 369
The internet and social media have blurred the boundary
between on- and off-duty conduct, leading individuals of all ranks
to be subject to public scrutiny and potential scandal. 370 While
this provides an additional incentive to companies seeking to
deploy such clauses, this Article argues that it is not always a
justification for a blanket restraint on legal behavior and speech.
After canvassing the various legal and public policy pressure
points inherent in morality clauses, this Article establishes a
rubric for their analysis. Our framework proposes examining
366. Wild v. U.S. Dep’t of Housing & Urban Dev., 692 F.2d 1129, 1133 (7th
Cir. 1982).
367. See supra note 209 and accompanying text (citing sources comparing
non-disclosure agreements and morality clauses to argue that morality clauses
should face the same level of judicial scrutiny).
368. See Brown v. M. Caratan Inc., 142 F. Supp. 3d 1007, 1035 (E.D. Cal.
2015) (determining that an employee can sue an employer for self-defamation
because an employer should have a reasonable expectation that the fired
employee will need to disclose the circumstances of his expulsion—breaching a
morality clause—to his prospective employer).
369. See supra note 359 and accompanying text (discussing how morality
contracts can occasionally provide issuers with fodder to act arbitrarily and in
bad faith).
370. See supra Part II.B.2 (discussing how employers constantly check social
media throughout the application process).
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morality clauses and their enforceability along five factors: nexus,
meaning transfer, scope, impact, and burden.
Simply put, morality clauses should be enforceable only when
(1) there is a reasonable nexus between the offending activity and
the imposing party’s legitimate business interests, (2) those
business interests are definite enough so as to assist a reasonable
person in predicting what is prohibited, and (3) the offending
activity causes or will foreseeably cause a reputational backlash
against the imposing party. In addition, courts should examine
(4) the degree of meaning transfer, or associative power that the
restricted party has with the company in the public’s esteem. For
instance, the private, moral failings of low-level employees may
be unlikely to mar an employer, but when the purpose of the
contract is to create an association or endorsement, the scales tip
in favor of the imposing party. Finally, courts should scrutinize
(5) the burden imposed on the restricted party, as morality
clauses can especially harm individuals with little bargaining
power.
An ex ante restriction on any behavior or speech that is
“potentially embarrassing” forces people into an imagined
conformity and “press conference” behavior both on and off the
job. 371 This chills speech, innovation, and challenges to the status
quo, not to mention forcing employees to check many of their
legal rights at their employer’s door. 372 Analyzing morality
clauses through the five-pronged analysis allows for their more
efficient, balanced, and just use and enforcement.

371. See Clark, supra note 80, at 13–14 (discussing the potential chilling
effect of speech that might be encountered by those subject to morality clauses).
372. Supra notes 203–206 and accompanying text.

